ICAM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION FACILITATOR | TRAINING COURSE





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Glossary of terms

Some terms relevant to this course are defined below.

Condition	A permanent workplace situation such as the type of equipment or workplace layout.
Circumstance	A short-term situation which is relatively unusual e.g., a storm or when a key person is absent.
Hazard	Hazard means anything that may result in injury to the person or harm to the health of the person.
Incident	Unplanned consequence of events, or a missing or inappropriate response. Any occurrence/event arising out of and in the course of employment which results in personal or property damage.
Incident site preservation	In the event of a notifiable incident, it is the responsibility of the person with management or control of the workplace to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the site (including any plant, substance, structure or thing associated with the incident) is not disturbed until an inspector arrives or otherwise directs.
Investigation	A systematic process of gathering and analysing information to identify the cause(s) of an incident.
Jurisdiction	Geographic area or division of industry or the community in which government has the power and authority to administer and apply certain laws.
SDS	A Safety Data Sheet (SDS) contains critical information about the health effects and appropriate control measures for chemicals used in workplaces.
Near miss	A situation where no one is injured or damaged, but this could have been the case.
Person Conducting a Business or Undertaking (PCBU)	 A person conducts a business or undertaking: (a) whether the person conducts the business or undertaking alone or with others; and (b) whether or not the business or undertaking is conducted for profit or gain.
Plant	Includes any machinery, equipment, appliance, implement or tool and any component, fitting or accessory.
Root Causes	The actions or deficiencies which allowed the direct cause to exist. These are usually the underlying causes of an incident.
Root Cause Analysis	A quality tool applying a multiple "why?" analysis, which is directed at identifying all causes responsible for an incident.
Worker	 A person who carries out work in any capacity for a business as: (a) a worker; or (b) a contractor or subcontractor; or (c) a worker of a contractor; or subcontractor; or (d) a worker of a labour hire company who has been assigned to work in the person's business or undertaking; or (e) an outworker; or (f) an apprentice or trainee; or (g) a student gaining work experience; or (h) a volunteer.



1.0. INTRODUCTION

Workplace injuries, work-related illnesses, dangerous occurrences, incidents, accidents, serious accidents and high-potential incidents can result in substantial costs to the companies and individuals involved.

There are obligations under both Mining and WHS/OH&S legislation for the person in charge of the business or undertaking (PCBU) / Site Senior Executive (SSE) to provide safe workplaces and systems of work.

Every workplace incident represents a failure in our Safety Management System, but it also gives us an opportunity to learn from the incident and improve our systems. So, it is crucial that we have processes in place when incidents do occur at our workplaces. Along with the first response of managing the emergency when needed to then have systems in place to respond to and investigate workplace incidents to ensure the effects of the incident are controlled, necessary reporting obligations are met, and an investigation is mounted to gain an understanding of both the immediate and underlying causes so that measures can be implemented to prevent a re-occurrence.



2.0 LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

Some jurisdictions require that the workplace has a process for investigating incidents. For example,

the *Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017 QLD* states:

15 Investigating accidents and incidents

A coal mine's safety and health management system must provide for the following the procedure for investigating accidents and incidents at the mine; making the investigation findings available to the mine's

coal mine workers;

implementing corrective action for accidents and incidents.

In addition, the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 QLD at S.30 states that to achieve an acceptable

risk, the mine should, amongst other things, have a process to:

(d) investigate and analyse the causes of serious accidents and high potential incidents with a view to preventing their recurrence;

Metalliferous mines in Queensland under the <u>Mining & Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017</u> <u>QLD</u> at sections 4,15 & 16 report certain incidents to be reported and investigated using certain techniques.

Reporting accidents and high potential incidents

A mine's safety and health management system must include procedures for workers reporting accidents and high potential incidents to the site senior executive.

Site senior executive's investigation of incidents

(1) In investigating the cause of an incident at a mine, the site senior executive must use techniques that—

(a) are appropriate for—

the nature of the incident; and

the nature and level of the hazards involved; and

are integrated with the risk management process; and

involve appropriate participation by persons involved in the incident.

(2) A mine's safety and health management system must provide for documenting the techniques that must be used for investigating incidents.

16 Giving inspector details of accidents and high potential incidents

This section applies if an accident or high potential incident happens at a mine.

If requested by an inspector, the site senior executive must give the inspector a plan, of the type and at the scale required by the inspector, or photographs, showing relevant details about the accident or incident.

Severity of an incident

Workplaces will usually have a scale for determining the severity of the incident which will usually determine the level of response, including the scale of an investigation, number and position of people to be involved and response time frame. This will vary from industry and workplace and might categorize incidents on scales for various Incident / Impact Types i.e., Health & Safety, Environment, Social, Reputation, Legal & Financial. Each of these categories may then be allocated a Severity Level according to the Scale of the Impact.

Part 1, Division 5 Offences and Penalties of the <u>Work Health & Safety Act 2011 (Qld)</u> categorizes incidents into three (3) levels of severity including:

Category 1 Reckless Conduct Incidents – Fatalities, serious matters and serious matters of public concern.

These include:

- high potential for a fatal incident;
- serious injuries;
- serious incidents which place a number of people at risk;
- repeat serious offences; and
- matters of political or community sensitivity (e.g., asbestos).

Category 2 Failure to Comply with Health & Safety Duty Incidents – Breaches of Legislation

All matters involving a serious breach of WHS/OH&S legislation.

Category 3 Failure to Comply with Health & Safety Duty Incidents – Compliance investigations

These matters generally arise from the suspected presence of particular hazards and possible breaches of legislation.

The regulator will process information they receive from complaints or reports (notifications). They categorise the information using a model similar to that above and respond accordingly. Category 1 incidents will be actioned immediately and may involve a formal investigation. Category 2 and 3 incidents will be prioritised according to information and resource availability. They may not involve attendance by the regulator but if they do, they generally result in "on the spot" action such as issuing a notice requiring the business to take action to control the risk. Similarly, some Mining regulators require specific actions to occur according to the 'type' of incident. For example, in Queensland, Coal Mining incidents are categorized as an Accident (S.15), Serious Accident (S.16) and High Potential Incident (S.17) and depending on which TYPE of incident it is, determines who should be notified, how they should be notified, by when and what must then occur including provision of the site's own incident investigation within a specified timeframe (S.198-201 & R. 15 & 16). Queensland Metalliferous Mines have similar requirements in the Mining & Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 QLD at sections S.16,17,19 and S195-198 and Regulation 14,15 & 16.

A number of jurisdictions have introduced **Industrial Manslaughter** provisions into their WHS / Mining Safety Acts, where it is an offence for a person conducting a business or undertaking (PCBU), or a senior officer, to negligently cause the death of a worker.

Numerous jurisdictions have maximum penalties of up to 20-25 years imprisonment for an individual or \$10-\$16.5 million for a body corporate (as of 22.12.21)




3.0 COMMON LAW DUTY OF CARE

The Common Law is a body of law that has built up over the centuries by the decisions of Judges, Courts & Tribunals.

One key aspect of the Common Law is of particular significance for WHS/OH&S as it has been incorporated into all Australian WHS/OH&S Acts. It is called the "General Duty of Care". It is the duty not to foreseeably cause harm to others.

In its uptake into WHS/OH&S laws, the Duty of Care has been interpreted as the duty to protect workers' health and safety; to not cause workers' harm. As such, the general Duty of Care provides the fundamental performance target of the WHS/OH&S legislation; an obligation not to cause harm to anyone who comes in contact with the business.

So modern WHS/OH&S legislation is based on an expectation that organisations will have systems in place for identifying and managing the risks that may arise, and the business has the general "duty of care" to not cause harm to their workers, contractors, visitors and others who may enter or otherwise be affected by their workplace activities including neighbours or members of the public.





4.0 WHS/OH&S LAWS

A person conducting safety incident investigation should have a thorough understanding of the relevant safety laws relevant to the site of the incident so that they can effectively response to the incident.

Due to Australia being a federation, WHS/OH&S is the responsibility of the various States and Territories. In 2011, the States and Territories agreed to harmonise their WHS/OH&S legislation to eliminate some of the differences between jurisdictions. Not all States have introduced the harmonised WHS/OH&S legislation. Mining Safety Legislation has not yet been 'harmonised' event though there have been attempts for this to occur and as such each State may have their own Mining Laws which may differ from State to State.

Regardless, the WHS/OH&S Acts are based on common similar principles which were adopted across Australia from the 1980s. Prior to the 1980s, WHS/OH&S legislation had been very detailed containing highly prescriptive requirements based mainly on manufacturing and construction activities and had origins in the UK.

Australian jurisdictions in the 1980s introduced a range of significant reforms mainly due to the 1972 report of the UK Committee of Inquiry into Safety and Health at Work, chaired by Lord Robens. The Roben's Report recommendations favoured a work health and safety system based on the Common Law General Duty of Care, capable of addressing safety in all workplaces and supported by consultative obligations and codes of practice.





4.1. Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation

Work health and safety legislation forms part of the Law, which is known as statute law, because it is written down in statutes or Acts passed by Parliament. It is presented to Parliament as a Bill, and if passed, it becomes an Act or the Statute.

Commonwealth WHS/OH&S law covers the WHS/OH&S of Commonwealth workers and certain other categories of workers, such as those on Australian registered ships and on offshore drilling rigs in Commonwealth controlled areas.

Each State and Territory in Australia has a separate **WHS/OH&S Act** which governs WHS/OH&S for all workplaces with the State or Territory, other than Commonwealth workplaces, where anyone conducts a *business*, which is generally where anyone conducts business or enterprise for profit, or *undertakings*, which is generally where anyone conducts non-profit making or non-commercial activities.

The harmonised WHS/OH&S Act introduced to most Australian jurisdictions imposes the broad general duties on a range of workplace participants including those in charge of the business, self-employed persons, occupiers/controllers of workplaces, manufacturers, suppliers and designers of plant and workers. Victoria, with its OHS Act 2004, is now the only jurisdiction that hasn't adopted the harmonized WHS legislation, with Western Australia having assented to the Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA) on 10 November 2020.

Codes of practice (or Compliance Codes in Victoria) provide practical guidance on how to achieve particular outcomes. The Act and Regulations are both enforceable, the Codes of practice are not, yet they do provide a benchmark against which the arrangements and performance of organisations and individuals can be tested by the Courts, if the organisations or individuals' own arrangements have been found to be wanting.

The term approved code of practice has a particular meaning under the Act. It provides minimum standards of health and safety and is intended to be used in addition to the Act and Regulations. A code of practice provides practical guidance on how a particular standard of health and safety can be achieved using the preferred methods or courses of action.

However, an approved code of practice allows the flexibility to use alternative methods provided they show that an equivalent or better standard of health and safety is achieved. An approved code of practice is therefore different from a regulation where the organisation must meet the requirements specified in the regulation.

There are other codes of practice developed by Safe Work Australia, used as guidance in complying with legislation. There is joint ministerial agreement that the states and territories will adopt national standards as a means to develop national uniformity across jurisdictions.



There are a number of Australian Standards covering an extremely broad range of topics and equipment. Australian Standards can have significance under health and safety legislation:

- 1. A standard might be referred to in a regulation with direct reference to providing information to relevant government agencies in accordance with Australian Standards (AS). In these circumstances, the Australian Standard becomes part of the regulation, and the PCBU or occupier should comply with the Australian Standard.
- 2. An AS could be approved by the relevant state or territory minister and gazetted as an approved code of practice. An example of an AS which has been through this process is AS 1657 Fixed Platforms, Walkways, Stairways and Ladders (South Australia 1995). This is of particular relevance to the regulation dealing with access and egress.
- 3. An AS that is relevant to health and safety and is not an approved code of practice or mentioned in the regulations cannot be ignored. It is incumbent that they are referred to where relevant.

There are other documents produced from time to time in the form of a **guidance note** or guide. They have no legal status but might assist in achieving greater understanding of specific issues or in complying with particular regulations by providing a series of alternative solutions.

Regardless of level of authority, you should establish which laws apply to the workplace where the incident occurred. If the incident occurred on a mine site, specific health and safety laws can apply which will vary depending on the jurisdiction. The first step is to identify the jurisdiction.

WHS practitioners must ensure that they have a sound understanding of these legislative bases for systematically managing health and safety; and that they are familiar with changes which occur in the various pieces of legislation.

In some States WHS/OH&S law is divided further into separate coverage of mining operations and mineral processing plants, petroleum facilities and other workplaces, with in some cases separate or partly separate administrative authorities such as in Western Australia for example. New South Wales and Queensland also have had mines safety legislation separate from that for general workplaces, and the administration of that legislation lies with separate government authorities such as the Department of Natural Resources and Mines in Queensland. In most States and Territories there is also separate dangerous goods legislation which applies generally in all workplaces.

Other important pieces of legislation relating to WHS/OH&S are radiation safety legislation and energy safety legislation, for example electrical and gas safety legislation, which also apply generally to all workplaces.

Road safety and maritime safety are also covered by separate State and Commonwealth legislation, but generally the WHS/OH&S legislation covering most workplaces also applies to road and marine workplaces.

Similarly, aviation safety is covered by Commonwealth Civil Aviation Safety legislation, but WHS/OH&S legislation also applies in some cases such as in relation to the risks associated with working in the cabin of passenger aircraft.



5.0 INCIDENT RESPONSE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

In order to comply with their legal obligations and as good business practice, companies generally develop detailed policies and procedures to help govern the way those hazards should be ma and incidents prevented. While there are many similarities between organisations' approach to dealing with incidents at their workplace, each organisations' policies and procedures may vary due to such things as the industry involved, types of incidents, damaging energies present in their workplace, geographical location, jurisdiction etc.

Policy

All businesses should have an Incident Investigation Policy that requires their business to respond to incidents and that all incidents including significant near misses be investigated. The Policy is usually a set of principles or rules that provide a definite direction for an organization and assist in defining what must be done when particular events occur. For every policy established an organization will need to create and document supporting procedures.

Procedure

An Incident Investigation Procedure is a clear step-by-step method for implementing the businesses policy or responsibility. A procedure describes a logical sequence of activities or processes that are to be followed in the event of an incident and to guide health and safety investigation personnel through the process of identifying and reporting underlying cause for a health and safety incident or near-miss'. The Procedure may address such issues as:

- Identifying those people with responsibility to respond to incidents.
- Emergency response training.
- Assessing the incident scene.
- First aid for those injured.
- Initiating the response by the emergency services when appropriate.
- Evacuation.
- Securing the scene.
- Notifying the necessary internal people (managers and safety personnel).
- Notifying the relevant regulatory authority.
- Conducting an investigation to determine the root causes.
- Taking effective corrective action.
- Rehabilitating the incident scene environment.
- Returning to normal operations.

You should not wait for an incident to occur before you familiarise yourself with your own company's policies and procedures. Prior preparation is essential if your response to incidents is to be prompt and effective.



5.1 Duty to respond to incidents

Under the WHS/OH&S legislation and Mining Legislation, there are various duty or obligation holders including employers (or know known as Persons Conducting a Business or Undertaking PCBU), Mine Owners or Operators, Mine Management (known as Site Senior Executive in some jurisdictions), those who manage, design, supply, install plant or structures, service providers, contractors, workers and others such as visitors etc.

All of these groups have differing duties in relation to providing safe workplaces and safe systems of work and depending on the circumstances, these duty holders also have a range of responsibilities to respond to incidents. Part 3 of the WHS Act for example outlines Incident Notification obligations including S. 35 What is a Notifiable Incident, S. 38 Duty to Notify of a Notifiable Incident and S.39 Duty to Preserve Incident Sites.





5.2 Incident Notification Requirements

The harmonised WHS Act requires the regulator to be notified of certain 'notifiable incidents' or 'prescribed incidents'. Those jurisdictions not harmonised have similar requirements. Mining in some jurisdictions also has a requirement that the regulator (and other parties) is to advise of certain notifiable incidents. For example, in Queensland the *Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 QLD* and the *Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 QLD* require the Regulator and the Industry Safety Representative (or District Workers Representative in Metalliferous Mining) to be notified of Serious Accidents and High Potential incidents.

Notifying the Queensland Petroleum and Gas Inspectorate about prescribed incidents is a requirement under Section 706 of the *Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 QLD*. Section 11 and Schedule 2 of *the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Regulation 2004* specify the prescribed incidents and notification requirements that apply.

A notifiable incident is an incident involving the death, serious injury, or serious illness of a person, or a dangerous incident. A serious injury or illness is one that requires the victim to have medical treatment within 48 hours of exposure, immediate inpatient treatment in a hospital, or immediate treatment for a serious illness or injury such as a head injury, spinal injury, or burn.





It does not matter if the victim actually receives treatment, only that the injury could be reasonably expected to warrant treatment as described. Dangerous incidents are those that expose a person to a serious risk to their health or safety. Examples include an uncontrolled escape, spillage, or leakage of a substance, an electric shock, a fall from height, or the collapse of a structure.

Immediately after a notifiable incident occurs, the PCBU must notify the regulator by telephone or writing (including fax or email). The PCBU must provide any information requested. If notification is by phone the regulator might require written notice within 48 hours.





5.3 Statutory reporting

The WHS/OH&S legislation places statutory reporting duties on the business in the event of certain types of incidents in the workplace. According to the harmonised WHS Act *S.35 What is a Notifiable Incident* is defined as:

- The death of a person, or
- A serious injury or illness of a person, or
- A dangerous incident.

According to the harmonised WHS Act **S.36 What is a Serious injury or illness** is defined as an injury or illness requiring the person to have:

- Immediate treatment as an in-patient in a hospital, or
- Immediate treatment for: o the amputation of any part of his or her body, or
- A serious head injury, or
- A serious eye injury, or
- A serious burn, or
- The separation of his or her skin from an underlying tissue (such as degloving or scalping), or
- A spinal injury, or
- The loss of a bodily function, or
- Serious lacerations, or
- Medical treatment within 48 hours of exposure to a substance.

According to the harmonised WHS Act **S.37 What is a dangerous incident** is defined as an incident in relation to a workplace that exposes a worker or any other person to a serious risk to a person's health or safety emanating from an immediate or imminent exposure to:

- An uncontrolled escape, spillage or leakage of a substance, or
- An uncontrolled implosion, explosion or fire, or
- An uncontrolled escape of gas or steam, or
- An uncontrolled escape of a pressurized substance, or
- Electric shock, or
- The fall or release from a height of any plant, substance or thing, or
- The collapse, overturning, failure or malfunction of, or damage to, any plant that is required to be authorized for use in accordance with the regulations, or
- The collapse or partial collapse of a structure, or
- The collapse or failure of an excavation or of any shoring supporting an excavation, or
- The inrush of water, mud or gas in workings, in an underground excavation or tunnel, or
- The interruption of the main system of ventilation in an underground excavation or tunnel.

Additionally, the harmonised WHS Act refers to *S.38 Duty to Notify of Notifiable Incidents* including the respective reporting timeframes and *S. 39 Duty to Preserve Incident Sites* discusses the requirements to preserve the incident scene and any exceptions due to particular circumstances such as making the scene safe etc.



Schedule 1 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017 QLD states that the following types of high-potential incidents must be reported to the regulator.

Schedule 1 Types of high potential incidents for section 198 of the Act

1 An unplanned ignition of gas, dust, or a combination of gas and dust.

2 The spontaneous combustion of coal or other material in an underground mine. 3 The entrapment of a person.
4 An electric shock to a person.
5 An unplanned event causing the withdrawal of a person from the mine or part of the mine. 6 An abnormal circumstances declaration.
7 An unplanned event that causes only 1 escape way from the mine to be available for use. 8 A fire on a vehicle or plant.

9 An incident involving an explosive.

10 A following incident that endangers the safety or health of a

person-

(a) a fire;

(b) a ventilation failure causing a dangerous accumulation of

methane or other gas;

(C) an inrush;

(d) a coal or rock outburst;

(e) damage to, or failure of, haulage equipment used to

transport a person in a shaft or slope;

- (f) an unplanned movement of, or failure to stop, a vehicle or plant;
- (g) the failure in service of explosion protection of explosion protected equipment;

(h) a failure of electrical equipment or an electrical installation;

(i) an unplanned ignition or explosion of a blasting agent or explosive;

(j) a failure of strata control;

(k) the exposure of a person to a hazardous substance;

(I) an unforeseen hazard requiring a review of the mine's safety and health management system;

(m) the unplanned immersion of a person in liquid;

(n) an unplanned movement of earth or coal;

(O) a structural failure of equipment;

(p) a collision involving a vehicle or plant.



Notice of an In	cident - Victoria
This information is a summary of the incident not conjunction with the legislation.	
Part 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety	Part 9 of the Equipment (Public Safety)
Act 2004 requires an employer or self-	Regulations 2017 requires a person in charge
employed person to notify WorkSafe	of prescribed equipment at an equipment site
immediately after becoming aware of an	to notify WorkSafe immediately after
incident at a workplace which results in—	becoming aware of an incident involving the
 the death of any person; or 	equipment which results in—
 a person requiring medical treatment 	 the death of any person; or
within 48 hours of exposure to a substance;	a person requiring medical treatment
or	within 48 hours of exposure to a substance;
 a person requiring immediate treatment as 	or
an in-patient in a hospital; or	 a person requiring immediate treatment as
 a person requiring immediate medical 	an in-patient in a hospital; or
treatment for— o the amputation of any part of his or her body;	 a person requiring immediate medical treatment for—
or	o the amputation of any part of his or her body;
o a serious head injury; or	or
o a serious eye injury; or	o a serious head injury; or
o the separation of his or her skin from	o a serious eye injury; or
underlying tissue (such as de-gloving or	o the separation of his or her skin from
scalping); or	underlying tissue (such as de-gloving or
o electric shock; or	scalping); or
o a spinal injury; or o the loss of a bodily function; or	o electric shock; or
o serious lacerations	o a spinal injury; or o the loss of a bodily function; or
o serious lacerations	o serious lacerations
Notice of Incident that Exposes a Person to Risk	
An employer or self-employed person must	Notice of a Dangerous Occurrence
notify WorkSafe immediately after becoming	A person in charge of prescribed equipment at
aware of an incident at a workplace which	an equipment site must notify WorkSafe
exposes a person in the immediate vicinity to an	immediately after becoming aware of an
immediate risk to the person's health and safety	incident involving the equipment which
through—	exposed a person in the immediate vicinity to
(a) the collapse, overturning, failure or	an immediate risk to that person's health and
malfunction of, or damage to, any plant that	safety through—
the regulations prescribe must not be used	(a) the collapse, overturning, failure or
unless the plant is licensed or registered; or	malfunction of, or damage to, any item of
(b) the collapse or failure of an excavation or of	plant listed in 45 of the Equipment (Public
any shoring supporting an excavation; or	Safety) Regulations 2017 and the Australian
(c) the collapse or partial collapse of any part	Standards referred to therein; or
of a building or structure; or	(b) an implosion, explosion or fire.
(d) an implosion, explosion or fire; or	
(e) the escape, spillage or leakage of any	In addition to immediate notification, a person
substance including dangerous goods as	in charge of prescribed equipment must provide
defined in the Dangerous Goods Act 1985;	a written record of the incident to WorkSafe
or	within 48 hours of becoming aware of the
(f) the fall or release from a height of any plant,	incident. This is the Approved Form for
substance or object; or	notification in writing.
(g) the following incidents in a mine:	U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U
(i) the overturning or collapse of any plant; or	
(ii) the inrush of water, mud or gas; or	





In all Australian jurisdictions, the WHS/OH&S regulators have standard forms which they require people to use when making statutory incident notifications.

For example, in Queensland Office of Industrial Relations Form 3 – Incident Notification form should be used immediately to report a notifiable injury: See a example on the follow page.

https://www.worksafe.gld.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf_file/0020/82505/incidents_form.pdf

A notifiable incident in Queensland Mines needs to be reported on Form 5A at: <u>https://mir.dnrm.qld.gov.au/mir/</u>

WorkSafe Victoria requires Employers, occupiers and people who are in control of workplaces and high-risk equipment are **required by law to notify WorkSafe about incidents** involving workplace health and safety, dangerous goods as well as explosives. WorkSafe must be notified immediately by calling 132 360 and then in writing within 48 hours using one of the approved WorkSafe Victorian forms.

The statutory incident notification forms and related requirements are all available through the relevant regulators' web sites.

Businesses usually detail who holds the responsibility for statutory incident notification in their policy and procedures and duty statements. The notification must take place "immediately" after the business becomes aware of the incident. The "immediate" notification should be by the fastest means i.e., telephone, facsimile, email or other electronic means.



5.4 Preserving the site of a reportable incident

The Model WHS/OH&S Act requires that the person with management or control of a workplace at which a notifiable incident has occurred must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the site where the incident occurred is not disturbed until an inspector arrives at the site or directs otherwise (whichever is earlier).

The Queensland Coal and Metalliferous Mining Legislation provides further detail about the scene of an incident in S.200 & S.201 of the *Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 QLD* and at S.197 & s.198 of the *Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 QLD*.

200 Site not to be interfered with without permission

A person must not interfere with a place at a coal mine that is the site of a serious accident or high potential incident of a type prescribed by regulation, without the permission of an inspector.

Maximum penalty—200 penalty units.

Permission under subsection (1) must not be unreasonably withheld.

For this division, action taken to save life or prevent further injury at a place is not

interference with the place.

201 Action to be taken in relation to site of accident or incident

(1) If there is a serious accident or high potential incident, the site

senior executive must—

carry out an investigation to decide the causes of the accident or incident; and

prepare a report about the accident or incident that includes recommendations to prevent

the accident or incident happening again; and

if the accident or incident is a type prescribed by regulation—forward the report to an inspector within 1 month after the accident or incident.

Maximum penalty—100 penalty units.

The site senior executive must ensure that the place of the accident or incident is not interfered with until—

all relevant details about the accident or incident have been recorded and, if possible, photographed; and

sufficient measurements have been taken to allow the development of an accurate plan of the site; and

a list of witnesses to the accident or incident has been compiled.

Maximum penalty—100 penalty units.



An incident site must be preserved as far as possible until an investigation has been completed. The site should remain as similar as possible as it was at the time of the incident.

If the site is altered because of a need to:

- protect the health and safety of a person
- aid an injured person
- take action to render the site safe
- take action to prevent an incident recurring

Steps should be taken to record details about the site before the changes and document steps taken.

The site can be preserved by limiting entry to those who need to enter only. This can be achieved through the use of hazard marking tapes or other physical barriers

5.5 Non-disturbance notices

An inspector has the power to issue a non-disturbance notice to the person with management or control of a workplace. The inspector must reasonably believe it is necessary to issue the notice to facilitate the exercise of their compliance powers.

Non-disturbance notices can instruct the person to preserve a site where a notifiable incident has occurred for a given period or prevent the disturbance of a particular site for a given and reasonable period. Preventing disturbance to a site includes the operation of plant. Non- disturbance notices must specify the period for which it applies and cannot exceed seven days. It must set out the obligations of the person to whom the notice is issued, the measures to be taken to preserve or prevent disturbance to the site, and penalties for contravening the notice.

The site includes any plant, substance, structure, or other thing. A non-disturbance notice does not prevent any action to assist an injured person remove a deceased person, which is necessary to make the site safe, that is associated with a police investigation or other action for which an inspector has granted permission.





5.6 Attend to initial needs of the incident

Initial needs could include

- first aid
- emergency clean-up
- access to information
- access to other areas of the site or building

A workplace incident can mean that any one or all of the following as occurred:

- people have been injured or made unwell by a work activity or event
- people could have been injured or made unwell by a work activity or event-this is referred to as a near miss
- equipment has been damaged or could have been damaged and, as a consequence, people are exposed to the risk of harm

The first responsibility of people in attendance at a workplace incident is to check the area and provide help where needed.

The following approach could apply:

5.7 Assess the situation

Assess the situation to ensure your own safety. This is because the safety of others might depend upon another person, and you will be of little assistance to others if you are also injured.

For instance, if a worker was overcome by toxic fumes, the person assisting could die in an attempt to help if the potential risks are not assessed accurately.



5.8 Provide first aid

The next step is to provide first aid. In some cases, it is appropriate to source first aid from another person, and you must be satisfied the area is safe, and that first aid is provided within the provider's capabilities.

The process of ensuring the area is safe involves the following steps:

- 1. Visually observing the scene and assessing the situation.
- 2. Undertaking a risk assessment.

Important points to consider include:

- the presence of plant or equipment whether anyone has been hurt
- whether anyone could have been hurt the hierarchy of control
- the presence of substances
- whether the presence of plant, equipment and/or substances have contributed to the injury the risk of immediate or further exposure
- the presence of particular hazards such as fire or electricity

It is also important to note that ongoing monitoring of workers involved in an incident may be required, particularly relating to symptoms of post-traumatic stress.

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a mental health condition that's triggered by a terrifying event — either experiencing it or witnessing it. Symptoms may include flashbacks, nightmares and severe anxiety, as well as uncontrollable thoughts about the event.

5.9 Plant and equipment

Plant can include things such as presses, computers, scaffolding, lifts, escalators, tractors, hand trolleys, cranes, welding equipment, electric power tools, forklift trucks and excavators; however, plant and equipment can also include a much broader range of machinery found in one form or another in every workplace.

Some examples of plant-related injuries include:

- crushing
- run overs by powered mobile plant such as forklifts
- rollovers relative to tractors and earthmoving machinery
- falls from plant
- entrapment and amputation
- electric shock

5.10 Actual and potential injuries

Workplaces have many hazards and if not managed properly can lead to incidents. The object of most WHS/OH&S legislation be in civil, or mining is to protect the safety and health of persons that might be affected by that businesses activity or operation and to require that the risk of injury or illness to any person resulting from those businesses operations be at an acceptable level. Invariably the hazards won't be adequately managed and as a consequence an incident will occur.

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Actual and potential injuries are caused by hazards. Physical and/or psychological harm can occur as a result of the following hazards:

- 1. Mechanical energy hazards. Mechanical energy hazards involve system hardware components that cut, crush, bend, shear, pinch, wrap, pull, and puncture. Such hazards are associated with components that move in circular, transverse (single direction), or reciprocating back and forth motion.
- **2. Electrical energy hazards.** Electrical energy hazards have traditionally been divided into categories of low voltage electrical hazards (below 440 volts) and high voltage electrical hazards (above 440 volts).
- **3.** Chemical energy hazards. Chemical energy hazards involve substances that are corrosive, toxic, flammable, or reactive involving a release of energy ranging from non-violent to explosive and capable of detonation.
- **4. Kinetic energy hazards.** Kinetic energy hazards involve things in motion and impact and are associated with the collision of objects in relative motion to each other. This would include impact of objects moving toward each other, impact of a moving object against a stationary object, falling objects, flying objects, and flying particles.
- **5.** Potential energy hazards. Potential energy hazards involve stored energy. This includes things that are under pressure, tension, or compression; or things that attract or repulse one another. Potential energy hazards are associated with things that are susceptible to sudden unexpected movement. Hazards associated with gravity are included in this category, and involve potential falling objects, potential falls of persons, and the hazards associated with an object's weight. This category also includes the forces transferred biomechanically to the human body during manual lifting.
- **6.** Thermal energy hazards. Thermal energy hazards involve things that are associated with extreme or excessive heat, extreme cold, sources of flame ignition, flame propagation, and heat-related explosions.
- 7. Acoustic energy hazards. Acoustic energy hazards involve excessive noise and vibration.
- **8.** Radiant energy hazards. Radiant energy hazards involve the relatively short wavelength energy forms within the electromagnetic spectrum including the potentially harmful characteristics of radar, infra-red, visible, microwave, ultraviolet, X-ray, and ionizing radiation.
- **9.** Atmospheric hazards. These hazards are associated with atmospheric weather circumstances such as wind and storm conditions, geological structure characteristics such as underground pressure or the instability of the earth's surface, and oceanographic currents such as wave action.
- **10.** Biological hazards. These hazards are associated with poisonous plants, dangerous animals, biting insects and disease carrying bacteria.

Some organisations have quite extensive hazard lists or categories that they are required to refer to such as the following Generic Energy Hazard Table.

Generic Energy Hazard	Definition
Biological	Potential for positive or negative impacts resulting from interaction of activities with biological agents. This could be harmed by exposure to biological hazards, flora and fauna including insect stings, bites, bacteria and other disease agents, viruses and natural poisons or environmental harm to biodiversity.
Chemical	Potential for harm by chemicals, includes acids, alkalis, organic substance (e.g., gases, fuels, lubes, degreasers, solvents, paints) ozone depleting substances etc.
Climate / Natural Events	Potential for harm by exposure to extreme natural, environmental or climate sources and events (including lightning, high winds flooding).
Dust / Inhalable Particulates	Potential for harm by exposure to fine dry particles of matter in the air. Dusts, mists, vapours and aerosols (Coal dust, silica dust, environmental nuisance/community complaints).
Electrical	Potential for harm to people, equipment/assets or the environment by exposure to electrical sources.
Ergonomics	Potential for exposure to physical actions or forces, including poor design, thus presenting the potential for harm associated with exertion, excessive, unnatural or repetitive movement, poor posture or other undesired physical stress on the human body.
Explosives	Potential for harm by exposure to explosive material (e.g., unexploded detonators, tie down lines etc.).
External Threats	Potential for harm resulting from an external event outside of the operations direct control (e.g. legislation, government actions, community lobby groups etc.).
Fire	Potential for harm by exposure to a burning mass of material (e.g., building fires, spontaneous combustion).
Gravitational (Objects)	Potential for harm by exposure to falling objects, unexpected movement (ground, slope, structure) due to uncontrolled gravitational forces.
Gravitational (People)	Potential for harm to people caused by their being subject to falling, unexpected movement or in any other way resulting from their being exposed to uncontrolled gravitational forces (including slips, trips, and falls).
Land	Potential harm on the naturally occurring environment due to the use or management of land resulting from pollution, clearance or any other degradation.
Lighting	Potential for harm resulting from excessive light or inadequate lighting in the workplace.
Mechanical (Fixed)	Potential for harm by exposure to interaction with sources of fixed mechanical energy (including those powered by electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, combustion etc.).
Mechanical (Mobile)	Potential for harm by exposure to interaction with sources of mobile (self-propelled) mechanical energy (including those powered by electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, combustion etc.).
Magnetic	Potential for harm to people, equipment/assets or the environment by exposure to magnetic sources (including handling metal objects in strong magnetic fields).
Noise	Potential for harm by exposure to sudden or prolonged exposure to excessive noise or community complaints.
Personal/ Behaviour	Potential for harm associated with intentional undesired behavioural actions, stresses or stressors.
Pressure/	Potential for harm by exposure to sudden release of pressure from a specific source (including
Explosions	pressure waves from explosions, pressurised systems, cylinders, springs, chains, flying bits, or community complaints associated with air blast overpressure etc.).
Psychological	Potential for harm associated with stressors from situations, conditions or events that could create negative emotional, cognitive or behavioural outcomes.
Radiation	Potential for harm by exposure to radiation waves whether natural or manufactured sources (characterised as either ionising or non-ionising sources).
Social / Cultural	Potential for positive or negative impacts resulting from interaction of business activities with social or cultural expectations (includes social licences to operate).
Thermal	Potential for harm by exposure to or variations in temperature (hot or cold) but excludes anything that is on fire which has a separate category.
Vibration	Potential for harm resulting from prolonged exposures to excessive vibration or blast vibration.
Waste	Potential for harm caused by the inappropriate use of resources inadequate management or disposal of waste material (including pollution and greenhouse gases).
Water Other	Potential for harm caused by the inappropriate use of water resources or inappropriate management or disposal of water. Potential for harm by exposure to other hazards/aspects e.g., friction, biochemical.
other	רסובוונומו וסר המדווד של פארטגעויפ נס טרופי המצמיעט/מסטפננט פ.צ., והנוסה, שטכוופוחונמו.



5.11 Types of incidents

In most workplaces, there is also a wide range in the potential nature and severity of the incidents that may occur. According to *the Australian Standard 1885.1 – 1990 Measurement of occupational health and safety performance Part 1: Describing and reporting occupational injuries and disease known as the Workplace injury and disease recording standard (pending revision, although current as of December 22,2021)* incidents are coded into four principal items: the breakdown event, the breakdown agency, the mechanism of injury/disease and the agency of injury/disease.

The *breakdown event* is the first event in the chain which eventually led to the most serious injury or disease, that is, the point at which things started to go wrong. The *breakdown agency* refers to the object, substance or circumstance that was principally involved in, or most closely associated with, the breakdown event. The *mechanism of injury/disease* is the action, exposure or event which is the direct cause of the most serious injury or disease. The *agency of injury/disease* refers to the object, substance or circumstance directly involved in inflicting the injury or disease. Codes should be allocated for mechanism of injury/disease as follows:

- 1 Falls from a height
- 2 Falls on the same level (including trips and slips)
- 3 Hitting objects with a part of the body
- 4 Exposure to mechanical vibration
- 5 Being hit by moving objects
- 6 Exposure to sharp sudden sound
- 7 Long term exposure to sounds
- 8 Exposure to variations in pressure (other than sound)
- 9 Repetitive movement with low muscle loading
- 10 Other muscular stress
- 11 Contact with electricity
- 12 Contact or exposure to heat and cold
- 13 Exposure to radiation
- 14 Single contact with chemical or substance (excludes insect and spider bites and stings)
- 15 Long term contact with chemical or substance
- 16 Other contact with chemical or substance (includes insect and spider bites and stings)
- 17 Contact with, or exposure to, biological factors
- 18 Exposure to mental stress factors
- 19 Slide or cave-in
- 20 Vehicle accident
- 98 Other and multiple mechanisms of injury
- 99 Unspecified mechanisms of injury



Codes should be allocated for breakdown agency and the agency of injury/disease as follows:

- 1 Machinery and fixed plant
- 2 Mobile plant
- 3 Road transport
- 4 Other transport
- 5 Powered equipment, tools and appliances
- 6 Non-powered hand tools
- 7 Non-powered equipment
- 8 Chemicals
- 9 Non-metallic substances
- 10 Other materials, substances or objects
- 11 Outdoor environment
- 12 Indoor environment
- 13 Underground environment
- 14 Live animals
- 15 Non-living animals
- 16 Human agencies
- 17 Biological agencies
- 18 Non-physical agencies
- 98 Other agencies
- 99 Unspecified agencies

Businesses need to protect against all of these events from happening. So, incident prevention can be seen as a very complex problem which often results in an equally complex set of arrangements being applied to prevent them from happening.



5.12 Ensure integrity of site

Once the area has been checked and people have been cared for, you must ensure the integrity of the site and safety of personnel is established and maintained in accordance with legal requirements. Health and safety legislation requires that the site not only has to be safe but must also be secured to avoid possible alterations to the scene.

This is important because in some cases, an investigation might be necessary and maintaining the integrity of the site ensures personnel safety and unnecessary disruption or tampering of evidence.

The period prior to the investigation is referred to as a non-disturbance occurrence and might happen when there are injuries resulting in amputation, loss of consciousness, major damage to plant and equipment and/or uncontrolled fire and explosion. In these cases, the site must not be disturbed to establish and maintain the integrity of the site and protect evidence.

Evidence must be preserved in order to ensure that the gathering of information is not complicated by unnecessary alterations to the scene. Retaining the incident scene as close as possible to what it was prior to the incident also assists the investigator to maintain objectivity.





The following actions can be considered:

1. Close off the area.

The area must be physically barricaded or marked as a no-go zone. This can be done by using barriers or special purpose tape. When barricading the area, you should take into consideration that any barriers might have the potential to cause an injury and care must be taken to reduce this risk. For example, if witches' hats are to be used, they should be placed in full view of pedestrians so people entering the site are not likely to fall or trip over them. Another point to consider might include the possibility of using barriers and forcing pedestrians into an area which is not safe.

2. Identify and advise relevant personnel.

Where people have been harmed or injured, a record must be made of injuries or illnesses that have been observed. Witnesses and others who could assist in describing the events that led to the incident must also be identified and their details recorded.

3. Protect evidence.

Ensure that any items of plant, substances or work procedures are secured. This can be done by preventing evidence from being removed or altered. Where relevant, it could also be necessary to identify samples of equipment and substances that could have a bearing on the investigation; however, where a formal investigation is to be conducted by a regulatory authority, evidence must not be disturbed until the investigating officer has given approval for such samples to be collected.

4. Observe and note conditions.

This could include a notation of any obvious damage to plant, equipment or premises as well as underlying environmental conditions such as temperature, wind, dust or odours. Observation should be done with the intention to ensure the integrity of the site so that as much as it is possible, conditions that prevailed at the time of the incident are preserved. This can assist the investigation team to understand what occurred more easily.



Legal requirements state specifically that an investigator has the power to direct either in person or in writing that the workplace not be disturbed; and:

- in conducting an investigation, an investigator can give a direction to: remove an immediate threat to the health or safety of any person allow the inspection, examination or taking of measurements of, or conducting of tests concerning, a workplace or any plant, substance or thing at a workplace direct, by written or verbal notice given to the person who is responsible that a particular workplace, or a specified part of a particular workplace, or particular plant, or a particular substance or thing not be disturbed for the period deemed necessary in order to remove the threat or to allow the inspection, examination, measuring or testing to take place
- the direction can be renewed by the giving of another direction
- where an investigator gives a notice to a person, that person must cause the notice to be displayed in a prominent place at the workplace until the direction has expired, been revoked or been varied

You should also as soon as is reasonably practicable after giving the direction, take all reasonable

steps to notify:

- the owner of the workplace, plant, substance or thing to which the direction relates
- a Health and Safety Representative {HSR)
- a PCBU who has control over the workplace, plant, substance or thing to which the direction relates, and whose workers use the workplace, plant, substance or thing in the performance of work for the PCBU

An important point to note is that pursuant to health and safety legislation, a PCBU who breaches these directives could be subject to civil action or a criminal prosecution. Information relating to the obligation to maintain the integrity of any site or personnel can be sourced by contacting the Australasian Legal Information Institute.

The legislation says that:

- the direction must include the reasons for the giving of the direction
- an investigator can revoke or vary a direction given by giving written or verbal notice

In the case where an investigator gives oral notice that the work site cannot be disturbed, you must ensure direction such as this is only given when the investigator:

- considers on reasonable grounds that it is necessary to give the oral direction in order to: remove an immediate threat to the health or safety of any person; or
- allow the inspection, examination or taking of measurements of, or conducting of tests concerning, a workplace or any plant, substance or thing at a workplace; and
- considers on reasonable grounds that there is not adequate time available to make a direction by written notice

The direction can be revoked by informing the PCBU or the organization's officers and at that time, the workplace can be re-entered.



6.0 ACCIDENT CAUSATION THEORY

Introduction

Accidents have been broadly defined as:

a short, sudden and unexpected event or occurrence that results in an unwanted and undesirable outcome ... and must directly or indirectly be the result of human activity rather than a natural event'. (Hollnagel, 2004, p. 5)

Understanding how accidents occur is vital to establish interventions to prevent their occurrence. Since the early 1800's there have been a variety of approaches. There are linear models which suggest one factor leads to the next and to the next leading up to the accident, and complex non-linear models which suggest multiple factors are acting concurrently and by their combined influence, lead to accident occurrence. Some models help in aiding our understanding how accidents occur whilst others are useful for supporting accident investigations, to systematically analyse an accident in order to gain understanding of the causal factors so that effective corrective actions can be determined and applied.



6.1 History

The history of accident models to date can be traced from the 1920s through three distinct phases.

- Simple linear models
- Complex linear models
- Complex non-linear models. (Hollnagel, 2010).

Each type of model is underpinned by specific assumptions:

- The simple linear models assume that accidents are the culmination of a series of events or circumstances which interact sequentially with each other in a linear fashion and thus accidents are preventable by eliminating one of the causes in the linear sequence.
- Complex linear models are based on the presumption that accidents are a result of a combination of unsafe acts and latent hazard conditions within the system which follow a linear path. The factors furthest away from the accident are attributed to actions of the organisation or environment and factors at the sharp end being where humans ultimately interact closest to the accident; the resultant assumption being that accidents could be prevented by focusing on strengthening barriers and defenses.
- The new generation of thinking about accident modelling has moved towards recognising that accident models need to be non-linear; those accidents can be thought of as resulting from combinations of mutually interacting variables which occur in real world environments, and it is only through understanding the combination and interaction of these multiple factors that accidents can truly be understood and prevented. (Hollnagel, 2010).



6.2 Simple sequential linear accident models

Simple sequential accident models represent the notion that accidents are the culmination of a series of events which occur in a specific and recognisable order (Hollnagel, 2010) and now represent the "commonest and earliest model of accident research ... that describing a temporal sequence" where the "accident is the overall description of a series of events, decisions and situations culminating in injury or damage ... a chain of multiple events" (Surry, 1969).

Heinrich's Domino Theory

The first sequential accident model was the 'Domino effect' or 'Domino theory' (Heinrich, 1931). The model is based in the assumption that:

the occurrence of a preventable injury is the natural culmination of a series of events or circumstances, which invariably occur in a fixed or logical order ... an accident is merely a link in the chain. (p. 14).

This model proposed that certain accident factors could be thought of as being lined up sequentially like dominos. Heinrich proposed that an:

... accident is one of five factors in a sequence that results in an injury ... an injury is invariably caused by an accident and the accident in turn is always the result of the factor that immediately precedes it. In accident prevention the bull's eye of the target is in the middle of the sequence – an unsafe act of a person or a mechanical or physical hazard (p. 13).

Heinrich's five factors were:

- Social environment/ancestry
- Fault of the person
- Unsafe acts, mechanical and physical hazards
- Accident
- Injury.

Extending the domino metaphor, an accident was considered to occur when one of the dominos or accident factors falls and has an ongoing knock-down effect ultimately resulting in an accident (Figure 1).





Figure 1 : Domino model of accident causation (modified from Heinrich, 1931)



Based on the domino model, accidents could be prevented by removing one of the factors and so interrupting the knockdown effect. Heinrich proposed that unsafe acts and mechanical hazards constituted the central factor in the accident sequence and that removal of this central factor made the preceding factors ineffective. He focused on the human factor, which he termed "Man Failure", as the cause of most accidents. Giving credence to this proposal, actuarial analysis of 75,000 insurance claims attributed some 88% of preventable accidents to unsafe acts of persons and 10% to unsafe mechanical or physical conditions, with the last 2% being acknowledged as being unpreventable giving rise to Heinrich's chart of direct and proximate causes (Heinrich, 1931, p.19). (Figure 2)




Figure 2: Direct and proximate accident causes according to Heinrich (1931)



6.3 Complex linear models

Sequential models were attractive as they encouraged thinking around causal series. They focus on the view that accidents happen in a linear way where A leads to B which leads to C and examine the chain of events between multiple causal factors displayed in a sequence usually from left to right. Accident prevention methods developed from these sequential models focus on finding the root causes and eliminating them or putting in place barriers to encapsulate the causes. Sequential accident models were still being developed in the 1970's but had begun to incorporate multiple events in the sequential path. Key models developed in this evolutionary period include energy damage models, time sequence models, epidemiological models and systemic models.

Reason's early work in the field of psychological error mechanisms (Reason 1975; 1976; 1979) was important in this discussion on complexity of accident causation. By analysing everyday slips and lapses he developed models of human error mechanisms (Rasmussen 1982). Reason (1990) went on to address the issue of two kinds of errors: active errors and latent errors. Active errors were those "where the effect is felt almost immediately" and latent errors "tended to lie dormant in the system largely undetected until they combined with other factors to breach system defences" (p. 173). Reason, unlike Heinrich (1931) and Bird and Germain (1985) before him, accepted that accidents were not solely due to individual operator error (active errors) but lay in the wider systemic organisational factors (latent conditions) in the upper levels of the organisation. Reason's model is commonly known as the Swiss Cheese Model (see Figure 3).






Figure 3: Reason's 'Swiss Cheese' Model

Unlike the modeling work of Heinrich (1931) and Bird and Germain (1985), Reason did not specify what these holes represented or what the various layers of cheese represented. The model left the OHS professional to their own investigations as to what factors within the organisation these items might be.

The "Swiss Cheese" model was only one component of a more comprehensive model he titled the *Reason Model of Systems Safety* (Reason 1997) (Figure 4).






Figure 4: The Reason Model of System Safety

Reason had a major impact on OHS thinking and accident causation in that he moved the focus of investigations from blaming the individual to a no-blame investigation approach; from a person approach to a systems approach; from active to latent errors; and he focused on hazards, defences and losses. Reason's Swiss Cheese and Systems Safety models were an attempt to reflect these changes.



James Reason (1997) highlights the role of information and consultation in determining the safety culture when he states that the key to a safety culture is an effective safety information system enabling an informed culture. He describes four underpinning cultures that combine to make an informed culture – a reporting culture, a just culture, a flexible culture and a learning culture. The description of each of these 'cultures' (given below) highlights the pervasive role of information, communication and consultation, and the environment in which this occurs, in an effective WHS/OH&S organisational culture.

A reporting culture

A reporting culture is where people not only report incidents but feel 'safe' in reporting where they feel there is potential for things to go wrong or a weakness that should be addressed. There are many reasons why people may not wish to report incidents – extra work, fear of getting themselves or others into trouble, past experience of little or no follow up action.

A just culture

Trust, and therefore a reporting culture, is not possible where there is a climate of blame; however, a 'no-blame' approach is neither feasible nor desirable. A just culture is an atmosphere of trust where people are encouraged and rewarded for providing essential safety-related information – but there are also clear lines between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.

A flexible culture

Organisational flexibility means possessing the culture capable of adapting effectively to changing demands.

Some organisations have the ability to reconfigure themselves when faced with a high work tempo or certain kinds of danger. A flexible culture involves shifting from the conventional hierarchical structure to a flatter professional structure where control passes to the experts on the spot and then reverts back to the hierarchical mode once the emergency has passed. This type of response is most often seen in high-risk areas where failure cannot be tolerated (High Reliability Organisations) such as air traffic control or warships.

Such flexibility requires shared values and assumptions and respect for the skills and experience of the workforce, especially first line supervisors and technicians.



A learning culture

An organisation must have the willingness and competence to draw the right conclusions from its WHS/OH&S information system, and the will to implement major reforms when the need is indicated.

Collective mindfulness

One of the investigators in the Piper Alpha explosion commented that 'when you only receive good news you start to worry'. This theme is carried on by James Reason (1997) who states that:

a safety culture should be the 'engine that continues to propel the system towards the goal of maximum safety and health, regardless of the leadership's personality or current commercial concerns'. The power of this culture should be 'not forgetting to be afraid'. (Reason, 1997)



6.4 Safety Triangle

In 1969, a study of industrial accidents was undertaken by Frank E. Bird, Jr., who was then the Director of Engineering Services for the Insurance Company of North America. He was interested in the accident ratio of 1 major injury to 29 minor injuries to 300 no-injury accidents first discussed in the 1931 book, Industrial Accident Prevention by. H. W. Heinrich (see Figure 5).

Since Mr. Heinrich estimated this relationship and stated further that the ratio related to the occurrence of a unit group of 330 accidents of the same kind and involving the same person, Mr. Bird wanted to determine what the actual reporting relationship of accidents was by the entire average population of workers. H.W. Heinrich's classic safety pyramid is now considered the foremost illustration of types of employee injuries.




Figure 5: Heinrich's Incident Pyramid

There Bird analyzed 1,753,498 accidents reported by 297 cooperating companies. These companies represented 21 different industrial groups, employing 1,750,000 employees who worked over 3 billion hours during the exposure period analyzed. The study revealed the following ratios in the accidents reported:

For every reported major injury (resulting in fatality, disability, lost time or medical treatment), there were 9.8 reported minor injuries (requiring only first aid). For the 95 companies that further analyzed major injuries in their reporting, the ratio was one lost time injury per 15 medical treatment injuries

Forty-seven percent of the companies indicated that they investigated all property damage accidents and eighty-four percent stated that they investigated major property damage accidents. The final analysis indicated that 30.2 property damage accidents were reported for each major injury. OHSA Occupational Health Services Australia © ICAM Learners Guide V24.1 - 43 | Page



Part of the study involved 4,000 hours of confidential interviews by trained supervisors on the occurrence of incidents that under slightly different circumstances could have resulted in injury or property damage. Analysis of these interviews indicated a ratio of approximately 600 incidents for every reported major injury.

In referring to the 1-10-30-600 ratio detailed in a pyramid it should be remembered that this represents accidents reported and incidents discussed with the interviewers and not the total number of accidents or incidents that actually occurred (refer to figure 9).

Bird continues, as we consider the ratio, we observe that 30 property damage accidents were reported for each serious or disabling injury. Property damage incidents cost billions of dollars annually and yet they are frequently misnamed and referred to as "near-accidents". Ironically, this line of thinking recognizes the fact that each property damage situation could probably have resulted in personal injury. This term is a holdover from earlier training and misconceptions that led supervisors to relate the term "accident" only to injury.

The 1-10-30-600 relationships in the ratio indicate clearly how foolish it is to direct our major effort only at the relatively few events resulting in serious or disabling injury when there are so many significant opportunities that provide a much larger basis for more effective control of total accident losses.





Figure 8: Bird's Accident Ratio Pyramid



It is worth emphasizing at this point that the ratio study was of a certain large group of organizations at a given point in time. It does not necessarily follow that the ratio will be identical for any particular occupational group or organization. That is not its intent. The significant point is that major injuries are rare events and that many opportunities are afforded by the more frequent, less serious events to take actions to prevent the major losses from occurring. Safety leaders have also emphasized that these actions are most effective when directed at incidents and minor accidents with a high loss potential. There is always a large variation between the most serious and no claim incident, as shown in both pyramids.

In 2003, ConocoPhillips Marine conducted a similar study demonstrating a large difference in the ratio of serious accidents and near misses (refer Figure 6). The study found that for every single fatality there are at least 300,000 at-risk behaviours, defined as activities that are not consistent with safety programs, training and components on machinery. These behaviours may include bypassing safety components on machinery or eliminating a safety step in the production process that slows down the operator. With effective machine safeguarding and training, at-risk behaviours and near misses can be diminished. This also reduces the chance of the fatality occurring, since there is a lower frequency of at-risk behaviours. The variation can be explained by distance or time – for example, the injury was missed by one second or by one inch. Machine safety can make a material. The difference in widening the variation, favourably impacting the frequency and severity of claims and, therefore, workers' compensation premiums.







6.5 Swiss Cheese Model

The **Swiss Cheese model** of accident causation model was developed by Dante Orlandella and James T. Reason of the University of Manchester (refer Figure 7). It describes how a series of breaches in an organisations safeguard can result in an incident. The slices of Swiss cheese stacked side by side represent differing layers and types of an organization's defenses against failure.

Reason stated that "if we were to make defences against errors out of cheese, we would use cheddar. But in actuality, they are more often like Swiss cheese - the defences are full of holes. In real life, unlike cheese, the holes are dynamic, constantly opening and shutting. Dame Misfortune is out there, trying to find a way through the holes. That happens quite rarely, because the holes don't line up that often."

The holes in the slices represent weaknesses in individual parts of the system and are continually varying in size and position across the slices. The system produces failures when a hole in each slice momentarily aligns, permitting (in Reason's words) "a trajectory of accident opportunity", so that a hazard passes through holes in all of the slices, leading to a failure. Reason suggested that most accidents can be traced to one or more of four failure domains: organizational influences, supervision, preconditions, and specific acts. The Swiss Cheese model includes both active and latent failures. Active failures encompass the unsafe acts that can be directly linked to an accident often referred to as the 'sharp end' of people doing the task. Latent failures include contributory factors that may lie dormant for days, weeks, or months until they contribute to the accident and are often referred to as the 'blunt end'. Latent failures span the first three domains of failure in Reason's model. The model is useful in a systems approach to understand the causes of incidents.






Figure 7: Reason's SWISS Cheese Model



7.0 ICAM

ICAM stands for Incident Cause Analysis Method. In April 2000, BHP officially launched its new safety occurrence investigation method, ICAM (Incident Cause Analysis Method).



ICAM is an industrial safety initiative that draws on the work of the eminent organisational psychologist and human error expert Professor James Reason (University of Manchester, UK). The ICAM methodology was developed with the assistance of Professor Reason, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and Dédale Asia Pacific, in consultation with safety representatives from all BHP business units.

ICAM is a holistic method. It aims to identify local factors and failures within the entire organisation system (e.g., communication, training, procedures, incompatible goals, equipment, etc.) which contributed to the incident. Through the analysis of this information, ICAM provides the ability to identify what really went wrong and to make recommendations on what needs to be done to prevent recurrence. It is directed towards building error-tolerant defences against future incidents.



7.0. Objectives

The objectives of an ICAM investigation are:

- Establish the facts.
- Identify contributing factors and latent hazards.
- Review the adequacy of existing controls and procedures.
- Report the findings.
- Recommend corrective actions which can reduce risk and prevent recurrence.
- Detect organisational factors than can be analysed to identify specific or recurring problems.
- Identify key learnings for distribution.

ICAM investigations are **not** used to apportion blame or liability.

The ICAM investigation process involves:

- Data collection using the PEEPO tool.
- Data analysis.
- Develop recommendations using the Hierarchy of control and Benefit assessment tool.
- Key learnings presented in an ICAM Investigation Report.

ICAM seeks to look further beyond a single root cause and focuses on:

- Immediate causes
- Contributing factors
- Underlying causes

ICAM encourages organisations to look beyond human error and identify organisational factors and better defences.

Immediate Cause

This is usually as a result of one or more errors or unsafe conditions that directly led to the incident.

Contributing Factors

The ICAM process organizes findings into five (5) elements:

- Non-Contributing Factors
- Absent or Failed Defences
- Individual / Team Actions
- Task / Environment Conditions
- Organisational Factors



Non- Contributing Factors

This category is for incident findings are for items that are fact however are not contributory to the outcome such as the date of the incident.

Absent Failed defences

Absent or failed defences are described as the 'last minute measures which did not prevent the outcome of the incident or mitigate/reduce its consequences' such as detection systems, protection systems, warning systems, guards or barriers, recovery, escape, rescue, safety device operation, personal protective equipment, hazard identification and control systems.

Individual & Team Actions

These are errors or violations that led directly to the incident. They are typically associated with personnel such as operators and maintainers having direct contact with equipment or material. They are always committed 'actively' (someone did or didn't do something) and have a direct relation with the incident'.

Task & Environmental Conditions

Task and environmental conditions are those conditions in existence immediately prior to or at the time of the incident that directly influence human and equipment performance in the workplace.

Organizational Factors

Organisational factors are those aspects which can be implicated in producing the task/environmental conditions, individual or team actions, or absent/failed defences that have allowed the incident or accident to happen.

These factors usually arise from organisational shortcomings which produce adverse conditions in the workplace. They can be hard to detect at times until combined with other local conditions such as leadership issues or errors in planning etc. As the name implies, organisational factors are controlled by the organisation itself and improvement of those factors can only be achieved through the utilisation and constant upkeep of the management systems in place.



7.1. Human Error

Human error is the failure of actions to achieve their desired ends, intentions or desires.

Everyone can make errors no matter how well trained and motivated they are. However, in the workplace, the consequences of such human failure can be severe. Analysis of accidents and incidents shows that human failure contributes to almost all accidents and exposures to substances hazardous to health. Many major accidents e.g., Texas City, Piper Alpha, Chernobyl, were initiated by human failure.

In order to avoid accidents and ill-health, companies need to manage human failure as robustly as the technical and engineering measures they use for that purpose.

The challenge is to develop error tolerant systems and to prevent errors from initiating; to manage human error proactively it should be addressed as part of the risk assessment process, where:


- Significant potential human errors are identified,
- Those factors that make errors more or less likely are identified (such as poor design, distraction, time pressure, workload, competence, morale, noise levels and communication systems) -Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs)
- Control measures are devised and implemented, preferably by redesign of the task or equipment.




7.2. Types of Error

There are two (2) main types of human failure (see Figure 8):

- Human error is an *unintentional* action or decision.
- Violations are *intentional* failures *deliberately* doing the wrong thing





There are three (3) types of unintended human error: slips and lapses (skill-based errors), and mistakes. These types of human error can happen to even the most experienced and well- trained person.

Slips and lapses

Slips and lapses occur in very familiar tasks which we can carry out without much conscious attention, e.g., driving a vehicle. These tasks are very vulnerable to slips and lapses when our attention is diverted even for a moment.

Slips

('Whoops') 'Not doing what you're meant to do'.

Examples of slips include:

- performing an action too soon in a procedure, or leaving it too late, e.g., not putting your ear defenders
 on before starting the drill; omitting a step or series of steps from a task, e.g., forgetting to switch the
 kettle on while making a cup of tea;
- carrying out an action with too much or too little strength, e.g., over- torquing a bolt;
- performing an action in the wrong direction, e.g., a MEWP operator pushing the joystick to the left instead of the right;
- doing the right thing but on the wrong object, e.g., selecting the wrong size nail for the job; and

carrying out the wrong check but on the right item, e.g., checking a dial but for the wrong value



Lapses

'Forgetting to do something or losing your place midway through a task.'

Examples of lapses include:

- forgetting to nail down a joist;
- taking your mask off to talk to a colleague and then forgetting to put it back on; failing to secure scaffolding because of an interruption; and
- forgetting to remove a radiator before removing the wallpaper.

Slips and lapses occur when:

- the task is very familiar and requires little thought; people confuse two similar tasks;
- tasks are too complicated and long-winded;
- the main part is done but the finer details are missed; steps in a procedure don't follow naturally; and
- there are distractions and interruptions.

How to reduce slips and lapses:

- make all workers aware that slips and lapses do happen;
- use checklists to help confirm that all actions have been completed;
- include in your procedures the setting out of equipment, site layout and methods of work to ensure there is a logical sequence;
- make sure checks are in place for complicated tasks; and
- try to ensure distractions and interruptions are minimized, e.g., mobile phone policy.

Remember, simply adding more training will not eliminate slips and lapses. Effective procedures are required.

Ask yourself: 'How can I make sure my workers understand that they are vulnerable to slips and lapses?'



Mistakes

Mistakes are decision-making failures. The two main types of mistakes are rule-based mistakes and knowledge-based mistakes. They arise when we do the wrong thing, believing it to be right.

Examples of mistakes include:

- making a poor judgement when overtaking, leaving insufficient room to complete the manoeuvre in the face of oncoming traffic; and
- an operator misinterpreting the sound of a machine breakdown and failing to switch off immediately.
- Why do mistakes occur?
- Doing too many things at the same time.
- Doing too many complex tasks at once.
- Time pressures.
- Factors which contribute to people making mistakes
- The work environment e.g., too hot, too cold, poor lighting, restricted workspace, noise.
- Extreme task demands e.g., high workloads, boring and repetitive jobs, jobs that require a lot of concentration, too many distractions.
- Social issues e.g., peer pressure, conflicting attitudes to health and safety, conflicting attitudes of workers on how to complete work, too few workers.
- Individual stressors e.g., drugs and alcohol, lack of sleep, family problems, ill health.
- Equipment problems e.g., inaccurate or confusing instructions and procedures.
- Organisational issues e.g., failing to understand where mistakes can occur and implement controls, such as training and monitoring.

How you can reduce mistakes

To avoid rule-based mistakes, increase worker situational awareness of high-risk tasks on site and provide procedures for predictable non-routine, high-risk tasks.

To avoid knowledge-based mistakes, ensure proper supervision for inexperienced workers and provide job aids and diagrams to explain procedures.

Ask yourself: 'How can I reduce the likelihood of mistakes occurring on this site?'



Violations

These are intentional failures – 'deliberately doing the wrong thing'. The violation of health and safety

rules or procedures is one of the biggest causes of accidents and injuries at work.

Workplace rules are broken for many different reasons:

Typical violations include:

- I felt I had no choice' (intentional due to the situation or rules).
- 'I didn't care about the consequences' (intentional violations).
- scaffolders not clipping on their harnesses above 4 m;
- dumper drivers not wearing seat belts;
- MEWP operators not carrying out pre-use checks;
- a site manager allowing untrained drivers to operate plant;
- a tradesman starting work on a new site without reporting to the site manager or receiving a site induction; and
- a worker thinking a rule is unsafe and taking off their safety goggles to improve visibility.

Typical causes of violations include:

- workers thinking rules don't apply to them;
- being under time pressure;
- not having enough workers to do the work;
- not having the right equipment;
- a lack of understanding of why the rule is in place;
- perceptions that rules are too strict or unnecessary i.e., the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived penalties;
- wanting to take the easy option;
- perception that they won't get caught; and peer pressure.

How you can reduce violations


- You can increase the chances of spotting violations by increasing routine monitoring.
- Make sure rules and procedures are relevant and practical. Are procedures hard to read or out of date? Explain to workers the reasons behind any rules and procedures and their relevance.
- Ask the workforce to get involved in changes to rules to increase their acceptance.
- Improve the working environment. Is the environment unpleasant (e.g., dust, fumes, extreme heat or cold)? Have workers got enough space to work in without discomfort or difficulty completing the task?
- Provide workers with appropriate supervision.
- Improve planning for all jobs to ensure the necessary resources (workers, equipment and time) are allocated.
- Encourage the reporting of any problems (such as job pressures) through open communication. Provide training for abnormal and emergency situations.
- Always think about the possibility of violations when carrying out risk assessments. Try to reduce time pressures on workers to act quickly in unusual situations.
- Assess the use of personal protective clothes and equipment (PPE). Have workers got the right equipment to do the job? Is the PPE difficult to use or uncomfortable?

Ask yourself: 'Is there any work activity on your site where rule breaking has become the norm?



8.0 ICAM PROCESS







8.1 Immediate Action

8.1.1. Emergency Response

Sites will have a process for responding to emergencies which will usually involve initiating their site emergency response plans according to the level of the incident. Investigators will be directed by the site emergency response coordinators. Investigators are required to follow all necessary safety instructions issued to them by those responsible for managing the response stages of an emergency / incident.

8.1.2. Identify Location

It is important to understand where the incident is. This may exclude certain people that may have been selected for the incident investigation due various factors including:

- Location if people have to travel away from home or overnight, they may not be able to be on the team. Also, if the site requires certain authorizations, inductions etc. it may be better to select someone already cleared for that site. Many locations require certain medicals and immunization clearances (i.e., Q Fever vaccination to enter abattoirs)
- Physical abilities if they are required to climb up onto equipment or enter confined spaces or go underground, they may not medically fit to do so.
- Psychological attributes if they need to go underground, climb heights or enter confined spaces they may not be capable.

8.1.3. Assess Severity

The size and composition of the team will also be dependent on the Level / Severity of the Incident. Most workplaces have a process for determining the level of the risk, time to respond and the degree of the response required.



	LIKELIHOOD	DESCRIPTION Considering the present and magnitude of the hazard and the exposure to that hazard. Number of people and frequency of the tasks exposing those people and also the status of existing controls
5	Almost Certain	The unwanted event is almost certain to happen within the life of the project. In the case of repetitive/ frequent task the unwanted event has or will occur in order of one or more time per year. In terms of major events, as also in the case of long-term health, environmental or social impacts, it may happen only once in the LOM.
4	Likely	There is a high probability that the unwanted event is almost certain to happen within the LOP. In the case of repetitive/ frequent task the unwanted event has occurred or is likely to occur in order of less than once per year. In terms of major events, as also in the case of long-term health, environmental or social impacts, it may happen once in the LOP.
3	Possible	It is possible that the unwanted event can occur within the LOM. In the case of repetitive/ frequent task the unwanted event has occurred or is likely to occur in order of 5-10 years. In terms of major events, as also in the case of long-term health, environmental or social impacts, it may possibly happen once in the LOM.
2	Unlikely	There is a low probability that the unwanted event to occur within the LOP. In the case of repetitive/ frequent task the unwanted event has occurred sometime or is likely to occur not more than 10-20 years. In terms of major events, as also in the case of long-term health, environmental or social impacts, there is a low probability for the event to happen in the LOP.
1	Rare	There is a very low probability that the unwanted event to occur within the LOP. In the case of repetitive/ frequent tasks there are no records of the event occurring or it is highly unlikely that it will occur within the next 20 years. In terms of major events, as also in the case of long-term health, environmental or social impacts, there is a very low probability for the event to ever happen.

EVENT RISK RATING/PRIORITY

	CONSEQUENCES				
LIKELIHOOD	Minor 1	Low 2	Medium 3	High 4	Major 5
5 Almost Certain	нісн	нісн	EXTREME	EXTREME	EXTREME
4 Likely	MODERATE	нісн	нісн	EXTREME	EXTREME
3 Possible	LOW	MODERATE	нісн	EXTREME	EXTREME
2 Unlikely	LOW	LOW	MODERATE	нісн	EXTREME
1 Rare	LOW	LOW	MODERATE	нісн	нісн



Consequence Level - Consider the maximum reasonable potential consequence of the event

Impact Type (Additional 'Impact Types' may exist for an event; iden- tify & rate accordingly)		Minor 1	Low 2	Medium 3	High 4	Major 5	
s	Harm to People - Safety	First aid.	Medical treatment.	Lost time.	Permanent disability or single fatality.	Numerous permanent disabilities or multiple fatalities.	
н	Harm to People – Occupational Health	Exposure to health hazard resulting in temporary discomfort.	Exposure to health hazard resulting in temporary alterations/n limitations (no time lost).	Exposure to health hazards/agents resulting in reversible impact on health (with time lost).	Exposure to health hazards/agents resulting in irreversible impact on health with loss of quality of life or single fatality.	Exposure to health hazards/agents resulting in irreversible impact on health with loss of quality of life of a numerous group/population or multiple fatalities.	
E	Environmental Impact	Lasting days or less; limited to small area (metres) receptor of low significance/sensitivity (industrial area).	Lasting weeks; reduced area (hundreds of metres); no environmentally sensitive species/habitat.	Lasting months; impact on extended area (kilometres) area with some environmental sensitivity (scarce/valuable environment).	Lasting years; impact on sub- basin; environmentally sensitive environment/recept or (endangerous species/habitats).	Permanent impact affects a whole basin or region; highly sensitive environment (endangerous species, wetlands, protected habitats).	
с	Social / Community Impact	Minor disturbance of culture/social structures.	Some impacts on local populations, mostly repairable. Single stakeholder complaint in reporting period.	Ongoing social issues. Isolated complaints from community members/ stakeholders.	Significant social impacts. Organised community protests threatening continuity of operations.	Major widespread social impacts. Community reactions affecting business continuity. "Licence to operate" under jeopardy.	
L&R	Legal & Regulatory	Technical non- compliance; no warning received; no regulatory reporting required.	Breach of regulatory requirements; report/- involvement of authority. Attracts administrative fine.	Minor breach of law; report/investigation by authority. Attracts compensation/ penalties/ enforcement action.	Breach of law; may attract criminal prosecution of Operating Co. and/or of Directors/Managers and penalties/ enforcement action. Individual licence temporarily revoked.	Significant of the law; may attract Individual or class action lawsuits, criminal prosecution of Co. Directors/Managers . Suits against parent Co.; permit to operate substantially modified or withdrawn.	
м	Material Losses/ Damage/ Busi- ness Interruption	< 0.01 % of Annual Revenue/ Total Assets.	0.01 – 0.1 % of Annual Revenue/ Total Assets.	0.1 – 1.0 % of Annual Revenue/ Total Assets.	1 - 5 % of Annual Revenue/ Total Assets.	> 5 % of Annual Revenue/ Total Assets.	
R	Impact on Reputation	Minor impact, awareness/ concern from specific individuals.	Limited impact; con- cern/ complaints from certain groups/ organisation (e.g. NGOs).	Local impact; public concern/ adverse publicity localised within neighbouring communities.	Suspected reputation damage; local/ regional public concern and reactions.	Noticeable reputation damage; national/ international public attention and repercussions.	



The following is a guide only of when an ICAM could be used in an incident investigation.

4	LOW	Incident Report/ICAM Optional	Supervisor Lead	
4	MEDIUM	ICAM/Incident Report	Manager Lead	
4	SIGNIFICANT	ICAM Mandatory	Manager with independent ICAM Team Leader	
	нісн	ICAM Mandatory	ICAM leam Leader	

8.1.4. Define Scope

The scope of the investigation refers to how detailed the analysis should be. Specifically, this could relate to the resources to be allocated or what the investigation will or will not cover. This is particularly important because in some cases, the incident does not warrant an extensive investigation and in others, a more far-reaching scrutiny is appropriate. Significant occurrences will require a far more detailed investigation than minor events. Likewise, incidents that involve injured workers or could have potentially injured workers demand significant investigative effort.

8.1.5. Form Team

It is important to ensure that the appropriate investigation team is selected to investigate the incident. Investigators should be skilled to facilitate an appropriate investigation. Organizations will often provide guidelines according to the nature and severity of the incident.

The team should consist of people who are familiar with the tasks and the work environment or sourcing assistance from an investigation team with specialist knowledge. In any case, the line manager or immediate supervisor is usually involved because they are more able to inform the team about the work processes related to the incident. If the line manager or immediate supervisor is involved in the investigation, consider the possibility there could be a conflict of interest. If the causative factor was inappropriate action by the line manager, it would not be appropriate to invite that person to be on the investigation team. Likewise, it is also not appropriate to expect decision-makers to evaluate their own decisions during the investigation. Therefore, officers should not be included in an investigation team if there is a perception that they could bring a biased view to the investigation.



Technical expertise

Specialist technical personnel may need to be sourced either from within your organization or external expertise may need to be sourced.

Incident sensitivity

If the incident has a sensitive or cultural aspect, then the team may need to engage someone familiar and skilled with dealing with that aspect.

Health and safety representatives

The Health and Safety Representatives / Site Safety Representatives have a legal entitlement to be part of a WHS/OH&S incident in their area of delegation.

Team Skill

The team should have the necessary incident investigation skills:

- Incident investigation techniques including gathering witness evidence via interviews.
- Technical skills and or specialist knowledge relating to work processes, equipment and workplace layout.
- Investigative skills, including an ability to observe and note details, take photographs, sketch maps and write reports.
- Familiar with and understand the company's incident investigation policy, procedure and necessary forms and processes.

8.1.6. Establish Roles

Most businesses have a roles and responsibilities matrix for level of involvement according to the differing levels of incident severity i.e., Management, Supervisors, Workers, HSR's, and Safety Advisors etc.

8.1.7. Gather Resources

Ensure the team has the appropriate team composition for the investigation and has the necessary equipment to conduct the investigation. It is good practice for workplaces to have an investigation tool kit stored in a central accessible location. We suggest the equipment gets stored in a secure light weight, hard plastic case.



8.1.8. Investigators Tool Kit

- People involved in the investigation can require some or all of the following equipment:
- Notepad and pen
- Clip board, lined paper and graph paper
- Digital camera and film which is preferably digital with a date recording facility
- Digital video camera
- High vis barrier tapes
- Tape measure
- Torch with batteries
- Safety Clothing PPE *i.e.*, safety helmet, safety glasses, hearing protection, high visibility clothing, long sleeved trousers and shirt, safety gloves, respirator, safety shoes/boots;
- Sunscreen, sunglasses and hat
- High visibility barrier tape,
- Compass,
- Identification Tags / Labels
- Collection containers / plastic zip-lock bags / pens
- Incident Investigation Report Form / Procedure
- Witness Statements and Forms
- Digital voice recorder and batteries
- Personal Danger and Personal Isolation Locks
- Caution / Out of Service Tags
- Magnifying Glass
- Crayons, chalk, fluorescent spray paint
- Hand wipes
- Spring force gauge / Digital Electronic Force Gauge
- Backpack (if having to climb up onto plant and maintain three points of contact)



8.1.9. Identify Barriers

Be aware that during any investigation there may be barriers including people's attitudes about the intention of the investigation (i.e., culture of blame), language and cultural issues, political / community sensitivity, timing (i.e. incident occurred some time ago and site may have materially changed), legal and regulatory matters (i.e. non-disturbance notice issued or business preventing access to incident location), environment (for instance testing equipment may not be able to be used due to explosive atmospheres etc.), geographical location (there may be restrictions on who can access certain areas due to site / cultural and other matters).

8.1.10 Secure Site

The team leader should ensure, that once the scene has been deemed safe, that the site is secured to prevent any contamination of the scene and alteration of any of the physical evidence. This can be done by the barricading, blocking of roads, appointment of a spotter etc. The team should establish if there has been any material change to the site since the incident i.e., removal of plant, equipment, documentary evidence etc. and if so, any relevant evidence that has been removed will need to be inspected / recovered.

8.1.11. Keep Safe

It is vital that the team only attend the scene if it is safe to do so. Team members should exercise all reasonable care which includes wearing all necessary PPE and following all relevant safety instructions. Sometimes natural inquisitiveness can be the undoing of safety investigators particularly when tor if they try and recreate the incident to understand what happened.

8.1.12. Get Authority

The team should only enter the scene if they have the necessary site or emergency co-ordinator authority / clearances to enter the scene. There may be other regulatory agency non-disturbance notices etc. preventing access to the scene i.e., coroner, police, and inspectors.



8.2 Plan Investigation

The investigation will be carried out in accordance with the company's incident investigation policy and procedures. Usually someone will be nominated as the incident lead investigator depending on the nature and severity of the incident. At this stage the incident category and scope of investigation should have already been determined and the appropriate team formed with roles understood.

Good ICAM teams should have a diverse background and some degree of independence. It is essential that the ICAM leader has sufficient seniority in the business to control the process and be willing to identify quality Organisational Factors. Depending on the severity of the incident a team might comprise an ICAM leader, a facilitator, a peer (from another shift usually, maybe a safety rep) of the person involved in the incident, a technical subject matter expert, and maybe a safety advisor from the area also.

Prior to attending the scene, it is good to first ensure everyone understands the site safety procedures, people are properly inducted or escorted, all investigators are wearing appropriate PPE and all necessary tools and equipment for the investigation have been gathered and are in working order and necessary escorts are in place.

Usually, it is good for the team members to have a briefing of the site, operations, incident, sequence of events, outcome and any remedial actions. This should be conducted by an authorized management representative with sufficient knowledge of the incident. Also, site will usually provide any preliminary information to the team about the incident including any relevant incident data collected. You may need to request this information.

The team should then seek to identify suitable site resources to conduct the investigation including:

- Venue for team to operate from
- Access to necessary resources phones, photocopiers, computers
- Identities, location and contact details of key site personnel
- Document control and evidence security



The team should then aim to determine the Terms of Reference of the investigation including:

- Objective of the investigation
- Roles and Authority of the Investigation team
- Task and timeframe
- Access to relevant areas, documentation and personnel
- Scope and boundaries / limits
- Site requirements
- Report Format
- Recipient/s of Report


The team should then put together an Action Plan detailing:

- Incident investigation overview
- Incident investigation team overview
- Incident investigation strategy
- Consultation and communication strategy
- Risk management plan
- Timeline of events
- Mitigation strategy
- Reporting and monitoring requirements



8.3 Collect Incident Data

The investigation team gather as much evidence as possible at this stage to determine the incident and the preceding events. The ICAM process uses the following PEEPO data collection process. It is important to gather all relevant conditions, actions and deficiencies which may have contributed to the incident.





Collecting data including conducting interviews, may can occur at any time in an investigation however they are usually conducted in the early stages of an incident investigation and often during the PEEPO stage.

To determine what is required during a PEEPO the team can locate a white board and some small sticky notes. Give the sticky notes to the team members and ask them to write anything they would like to know in the form of data under any of the PEEPO (People, Environment, Equipment, Procedures, Organisation) categories.

The ICAM leader / facilitator could ask a team member for them to jot down on the sticky notes what would they like to know about the incident that might help them understand what happened. That note should then be stuck up on the whiteboard under the relevant PEEPO category. Once completed the team can then gather the notes and then use that as a guide for what the team should ensure they gather in the investigation. The team can reconvene at a later date to determine what data has subsequently been collected and hopefully sufficient data has been collected in the various PEEPO categories for the formation of a timeline.



People



Conducting Interviews

People often know a lot about what happened. Often, we fail to adequately gather the information available to us through those that either were involved in the incident or witnessed the incident. To ensure we get a good picture of what happened we should aim to:

Identify all persons who were involved directly or indirectly with the incident

Identify all people who witnessed the incident and establish their role, location, any involvement or ownership over the incident / plant / process

It is best to try and keep the witnesses apart and preferably interview them at the scene as soon as practical after the incident. You be conscious of any post-traumatic stress indicators and if you suspect that the person is showing signs of PSTD that you refer that to their supervisor of the company management for any critical incident debriefing and referral to an Employee Assistance Program for counselling. Persons being interviewed should be reassured of the reason of the interview, the allowance of a support person to be present (i.e., an HSR) and that the interview is trying to establish the reasons and not apportion blame (i.e., Just Culture Process).

Try and get the following information from the witness

- What they saw
- Where were they there
- What experience / training / competency do they have
- What they think happened
- Where they were located and what they were doing at the time
- Who and what plant was involved
- What was the condition of the environment at the time
- What did they do when they saw it happening
- Has this happened previously
- Why they think the incident happened
- How could it have been prevented



PEEPO CATEGOR	(PEOPLE	Č	R
		CHRONOLGY		
BEF	ORE	DURING	AFTER	
FACTOR	INFORMATION			CHECK
Ability	Training, Experient			
Attitude		our, Blasé, Poor Com	-	
Awareness	Knowledge of haza	ard / situation / poter	ntial	
Communication	Type, Frequency, A	Adequacy, Delivery M	ode	
Fatigue	Roster, Work Cycles, Time Sheets, Mental & Physical Fatigue, Life events			
Psychology				
Physiology				
Supervision	Amount, quality, le	evel of supervision		
Teamwork	Poor co-ordinatior	n, workload sharing et	tc.	
Records				
History		nistory of key people	involved	
Individual / Team Factor (not specified)				



Environment



ENVIRONMENT

It is important to inspect the physical location of the incident as soon as possible as it can change very quickly. By attending the incident location promptly, you can gather valuable information about whether any local environmental conditions contributed to the incident. You will be able to determine:

- Weather conditions
- Understand the scene and the location of other relevant connected features
- Time of day & lighting / sun direction
- Glare, noise, dust, fumes, vibration, temperature
- Workplace conditions
- Condition of Plant & Equipment
- Location of Plant and Equipment
- Housekeeping

Taking Photos / Video

Recording the scene with still and motion photography is an excellent way to record the event and can become very powerful and useful data in an incident investigation. Here are some tips when taking photography

- attempt to obtain an overall picture of the scene, taking several photographs from different angles, both close up and wide-angle views
- photograph the ground surface, indicating the general condition and slope
- photograph individual items that can be relevant to the investigation such as barriers, guards, markings and signage
- photograph plant and equipment involved in the accident
- place an object such as a ruler against the item to be photographed to indicate dimensions or provide perspective
- do not include people unrelated to the incident in the photograph
- ensure the photograph includes: the name of the person taking the photo, the date and time that the photo was taken, a notation as to the location where each photograph was taken a brief description indicating what the photograph is showing the orientation of where the photograph was taken from.



PEEPO CATEGORY		ENVIRONMENT			
BEFORE		CHRONOLGY DURING	AFTER		
DEFORE		DORING	AFIER		
FACTOR	INFORMATIO	N		CHECK	
Acceleration/		s due to change of velo	ocity		
deceleration					
Air / liquid pressure	Sudden chang release, decompressio				
Contaminants	Natural or ma	n-made, smoke dust, g	gases, chemicals, etc.		
Electricity	Natural or ma	n made	-		
Equipment design / construction	Faulty or unsa	Faulty or unsafe equipment used			
Illumination	Too much / lit	tle light			
Noise	worker in carr	ying out tasks	h interferes / disrupts a		
Precipitation	Water, moistu				
Procedures		Poor, inadequate procedure / documentation			
Radiation	for example, >	<-rays, sunlight, UV, las	ser		
Repetitive operation					
humidity					
Unstable strata					
Vibration	Actions	and a strend strend	and some a Const		
Wildlife		ence of animals causing	-		
Wind / turbulence		Natural or man-made causing adverse effects			
Work surface / space	for example, holes, rough, slippery, confined				
Task / environment factor (not specified)	Used to state that 'Yes' a task / environment factor was involved but was not specified / identified / categorized.				
Other task /					
environment factor					
No task /					
environment factor involved					



Equipment



EQUIPMENT

It is very important that the team inspect any plant, tools or equipment that were involved in the incident. Particular attention should be given to the state and condition that the equipment was in, any damage, mark, scratches, deformation etc. Also, regard should be had to determine whether it was the appropriate equipment for the task as per the work instructions, safe work method statement, lift plan and whether the equipment is still within its inspection maintenance date and is current. Record any labels, tags, marks, identification, serial numbers, SWL's, last test date, maintenance records, last calibration date, and pre-start books. Ensure that the equipment was fit for its purpose and if required it had the relevant Australian Standard marking on it etc. Record the name, brand, manufacturers' details, registration number, plant identification of each item of equipment. It is good practice to also photograph this information.

The investigating team should try and determine if the equipment was a contributing factor by asking the following example questions

- What equipment was being used at the time?
- Is that the usual equipment used for the job?
- Was it the correct equipment according to the work procedures / instructions?
- Did the equipment contribute to the incident?
- What was the condition of the equipment?
- Were any substances being used at the time?
- What competency do workers need to use this equipment



PEEPO CATEGO	RY	EQUIPMENT		
		CHRONOLGY		
B	EFORE	DURING	AFTER	
	-			
FACTOR Design		nts of the task and the	re fit for purpose and e operating conditions	CHECK
Construction	The equipment was safe by design and constructed to the relevant safety standards required in that jurisdiction			
PPE Requirements	The PPE used was appropriate to the task / energy / contaminant / SDS and the condition of the protective clothing and accessories were in good condition and selected, used and fitted appropriately.			
Testing	The equipment was tested, inspected and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer requirements of relevant industry standards.			
Inspection	The equipment was inspected at scheduled intervals in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications and industry standards upon initial delivery, periodically and during critical times			
Maintenance	The equipment should be maintained to the manufacturer's recommendations to maintain the original design performance safety and reliability standards			
Modification	Equipment modifica procedure to ensure adversely affected a	ation should be carrie e performance, safety and should also accou	y and reliability are not	



Procedures



All relevant work procedures, instructions or approved methods should be reviewed to determine whether this contributed to the incident. The investigators should ensure that the instructions were available, correct, updated and appropriate for the task being undertaken. The following example questions could be asked:

- Was there a work procedure or instruction for the task?
- Did you use those procedures?
- Was it appropriate for that task on that day?
- Did you have it available to you?
- Were risk assessments conducted on this task?
- What tools, plant or equipment were available for the task?
- Were they appropriate and used in accordance with the procedure / instruction?
- Were there any safety devices?
- Were they used for that task?
- Were any lock-out procedures required for the task?
- Were they used?



PEEPO CATEG	ORY	PROCEDURES		
		CHRONOLGY		
	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	
FACTOR	INFORMATION			CHECK
Usage	The documented proc	cedures within the org he operation in a corre		
Content	The documented procedures are required to match the scope of the work. The procedure should cover all tasks, be technically correct, contain emergency provisions, contain work-around provisions, cover exemptions where the entire procedure does not apply.			
Criteria	user -friendly languag			
Review and Monitoring	necessary, by qualifier relevant to the curren	d be regularly reviewe d people. The procedu at state of the equipme	ure needs to be ent or task.	
Document Control		l have a method of rev res are available to wo	vision control to ensure orkers.	



Organisation



ORGANISATION

The business and its management have a statutory duty to ensure that the workplace is safe. In any incident investigation, the role of the management and supervisors needs to be considered. The following questions are examples of what could be asked:

- How were you instructed to do that task?
- What safety instructions were given to you by your supervisors?
- Were you supervisors aware of how you performed that task?
- Were you supervisors regularly present whilst you were working?
- Did your supervisors conduct regular safety observations of the work that was being performed?
- Would the supervisors correct unsafe work practices if they saw them?
- How were unsafe practices and conditions detected in your workplace?
- What processes did you have available to you if you identified a hazard that you couldn't control?
- Would unsafe conditions get corrected promptly?



PEEPO CATE	GORY	ORGANISATION	C	品
		CHRONOLGY		
	BEFORE	DURING	AFTER	
FACTOR	INFORMATION			CHECK
Culture	The organization should have a systematic approach to WHS. There should be evidence of management leadership and commitment to high standards for safety, quality and productivity. Factors to be measured could include organizational structure, people management, safe provision of plant, tools and equipment, regular scheduled maintenance, communication etc.			
Training	There should be evidence of structured effective training for technical skills, safety awareness and knowledge with ongoing competency reviews.			
Resourcing	There should be appropriate resourcing for operational staff including provision of appropriate staffing, suitable fit for purpose equipment and material and adequate facilities and services.			
Operational Feedback	The business should ha monitoring and continuous improv	ve a formal and effective vement.	feedback system for	



Other Data Sources

The following data sources can also prove valuable in the collection of relevant incident data.

Sketches and measurements

Measurements, diagrams and sketches at the scene of the incident provide an overall perspective of people and machinery in relation to the incident. Sketches can be drawn freehand into the notebook being used to record observations of the scene. All sketches should be drawn with a pen and should represent an accurate projection of the item or map being drawn. This can be done by including a scale and orientation on the sketch. Ideally sketches are best done on graph paper. The scale can be calculated by taking a measurement of the area and using a simple conversion for representation on the sketch. If the area is 10 millimetres in length, a simple scale might be one centimetre is equal to one metre etc. The orientation can be shown on the sketch by using a compass rose and indicating north. Sketches should be dimensionally accurate.

Maps

Maps are very useful to show location of incident relative to other important locations. It can help explain time delays for response, access difficulties, size of an area etc. It is particularly useful for people not familiar with the location to understand time and distance etc.



Samples

A sample is any substance that is collected from the scene of an incident. It can be in the form of a liquid, gas or solid including powder or dust. When collecting samples, it is important to avoid damaging or contaminating the sample because it can provide valuable evidence.

When participating in the process of collecting samples, you should ensure all team members are using appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) including masks, protective eyewear, or gloves. In some cases, samples will be collected for analysis by specialist agencies or testing laboratories. These agencies can have specific requirements in relation to the way in which the sample is collected and presented.

When taking samples, you should:

- make sure they take enough of the substance for the type of analysis or examination to be undertaken
- ensure that in collecting the sample, they do not damage other evidence
- divide the sample into two separate parts and seal each part in a suitable container and label each container to avoid confusion about the contents
- keep a separate record of the samples taken and the arrangements for testing
- keep at least one of the samples stored securely
- include the investigator's name, the time and date that the sample was taken, location of where the sample was taken, the sample number and a brief description

Documentary evidence and Data Preservation

Documentary evidence includes any document containing writing or printing that is relevant to the investigation. This includes operating manuals, company records, training records, plant and chemical registers, medical and health screening records and other documents. Data needs to be stored in some instances for 30-40 years for certain health records. Constructions SWMSs are required to be kept for 2 years if there is an incident with that task and legal departments would advise that incident records be kept for much longer periods. Handwritten notes, drawings, and sketches, photos etc. should all be kept and stored in accordance with site procedures.



Confidentiality, privacy and legal implications

In collecting evidence, the investigator must regard a range of issues that have implications for the final outcomes of the investigation, including the acceptance of the report. In the course of the investigation, the investigator might collect information about particular individuals that is of a private or personal nature.

The investigation team must give due regard to privacy considerations in the collection and reporting of any information. Any information not directly relevant to the incident such as the person's employment history must remain confidential and is not to be included in any report. Personal details are also not to be discussed with other individuals such as co-workers or supervisors.

In the event an external contractor is sourced to assist with the investigation, be mindful of corporate confidentiality. Trade secrets and confidential information that relates to the organization's business should be protected from disclosure to competitors. Information relating to production techniques, production schedules and rates are matters that many businesses prefer to keep confidential.

As a precautionary measure, you can ask the contractor to sign a confidentiality agreement to ensure that any sensitive information gathered in the course of your investigation is not provided to competitors. Notwithstanding the need to maintain the confidentiality of certain information, you can be obliged to provide relevant information to regulatory authorities. In this case, it is important to provide all necessary assistance and cooperation to any investigation that is being conducted by a health and safety inspector of a regulatory authority. This is also a legal requirement.

It is essential to ensure all evidence obtained is relevant and admissible. This to consider include:

- Whether the evidence was legally obtained: Eg. Did the investigation team have authority to access a particular document/s, security clearance for the investigation and in some jurisdictions the use of recording devices may not be legal.
- Relevance of the evidence: Evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. Another element of relevancy would be whether the witness is credible.



Interviewing Techniques

The interview must be documented, and the facts carefully recorded. This is particularly important where:

- the incident is serious
- people involved in the incident make allegations or contradictory comments about what occurred

The interview process must be fair and impartial, and the interview be recorded accurately. You can do this by following interview principles.

Approach	The interview process must be fair and impartial, and the interview be
	recorded accurately.
Ground Rules	Let witnesses know that the purpose is to find out what happened
Just Culture	Ensure witnesses understand that the organization adopts a 'No Blame'
	Approach
Time	Conduct the interview as soon after the incident
Prepare	Attend scene, gather relevant information, understand basic facts of
	incident, have relevant information on hand
Venue	Select private venue, minimize distractions
Prioritise	Create interview list and priority order
Introduce	Introduce witness to interviewers, explain purpose, build rapport,
	emphasis Ground Rules
Document	Understand content before recording information
Good Listener	Show interest, adopt interested body language
No jargon	Use simple language, avoid acronyms and clarify understanding of
	technical matters
Structure	Use appropriate questioning techniques
Emotional Support	Monitor witness, consider support person, provide breaks, refer to EAP
	/ Counselling
Recommend	Ensure the interviewee is asked how the incident could have been
	prevented
Future	Advise of possible further interviews, way of providing additional
	information to the team
Finish	Thank the witness
Follow up	Encourage witness to contact team if further information is recalled.
	Contact witness if required to clarify new information.
	Good practice to re-contact witness to determine their recollection and
	if new information has been remembered.



Be a good listener

As well as asking the right questions, the interviewer also needs listening skills. This involves carefully following what a speaker is saying because the person being interviewed can introduce new information and that can warrant pre-planned questions irrelevant.

Skilful listening also requires you to suspend judgement about interviewees and their views. This is because preconceived prejudices or stereotyping can lead to a situation where the interviewer hears what they expect to hear rather than what is actually said.

Ask the right questions

It is helpful in commencing an interview to ask the person to explain in their own words what happened. This helps you to obtain an overall picture of the incident and can also serve to put the interviewee at ease. The interview should be clear and concise and should gather all relevant information. This can involve bringing the interviewee back to the question by discouraging digressions and unnecessarily long answers. The interviewer should identify any omissions, errors or contradictions emerging from the interview and resolve these with the interviewee.

Be familiar with technical terms and jargon

Where necessary, clarify these matters in the course of the interview, ensuring that where first names are used the interviewee is asked to provide the full name of the person and if possible, the person's job title.

Never suggest possible answers

During an interview, situations can arise where interviewees will say things that might be ambiguous or confusing. In these cases, you might need to repeat a question or rephrase a response. This can provide a useful opportunity to check any interpretation and confirm the interview is an accurate reflection of the incident. An important point to consider at this stage is that the interview is not a forum by which to assign blame.



Quality questioning techniques Free

Recall / Narrative

This style of question asks the witness to mentally recreate the incident. An example would be:

'Can you explain to me whatever you can remember about the incident.'

Open Ended Question

Each question should start with one of the following words - Who what when where how why. You could ask 'How did the accident happen?

This is an open question and one that will not result in a yes or no answer. The person conducting the interview should also ask one question at a time and wait for the answer to be completed before continuing. A short pause after each question can allow for the person responding to think about their answer prior to providing information. Another useful technique is to ask concise questions using simple, easy-to-understand language. Where technical terms or jargon is used, you should ask the interviewee to explain what they mean.

Closed End Question

This style of question is used to clarify and confirm understanding of certain matters. Questions such as 'So the accident happened at 7am?' 'You were driving on the haul road at the time of the accident?'



Paraphrasing

This style of question is attempting to summarise the information provided to confirm understanding. Sometimes the interviewer misunderstands what has been said or makes assumptions. By repeating back to the interviewee what you think has been said will confirm whether what you think has been said is in fact correct. An example might be:

'So, you said as you were driving along the East Haul Rd, travelling about 50kmph, your mobile phone rang, so as you reached down to grab it off the passenger's seat you heard a loud bang and a kangaroo came flying through the front window, have I got it right so far?'.

Active Listening

Active listening requires that the **listener** fully concentrate, understand, respond and then remember what is being said. The listener should show interest in what is being said with appropriate verbal and body language ques. Examples of good active listening is good eye contact, nodding of the head, leaning forward, not getting distracted, using appropriate verbal cues 'Yes, ok, right..'

There are certain types of questions that should be avoided when conducting an interview, such as:

Leading questions

These are questions that lead the interviewee to provide a particular response. Some examples include:

'You saw Patrick near the machinery, didn't you?' 'Laura tripped on the slippery floor, didn't she?' 'The travellator stopped when it became overloaded didn't it?'



Double-barrelled questions

A double-barrelled question is where more than one question is asked in a single sentence. This is confusing for interviewees and will often result in poor responses. This type of questioning should be avoided. Examples of double-barrelled questions include:

'What is your role in the company and how long have you been doing this?' 'What action has the company taken to prevent this incident from happening again and do you agree with it?'

These questions are better presented as separate questions without a request to provide an opinion.

Questions that reveal attitude or opinion

Questions that express particular views or attitudes about the incident or related matters should be avoided. The following questions are designed to reveal attitudes or opinions:

'I know that we have had trouble with Dave in the past, but...' 'It is obvious you do not like the supervisor, does this mean...'

You should not give any indication as to any uncertainty or lack of knowledge about a situation. An inappropriate way to begin a question would be to suggest that something might not be very important, and to ask the question regardless.



Interview difficulties

In the course of interviewing people, difficult situations can arise. These difficult situations can be created by those who feel they are being blamed or by those seeking to blame others. In some cases, the interviewee can become hostile or angry. In these situations, selective questioning can steer the interview away from sensitive issues. You should:

- stay calm
- stick to the facts
- put the interviewee at ease and to clarify the purpose of the interview
- not take sides
- involve one or more team members in the interview when the interviewee is likely to be aggressive

Asking questions designed to find out why and how, rather than what

Asking questions focusing on what caused the incident can lead to simplistic and subjective conclusions such as:

- the machine was not guarded, and this is the cause of the accident
- the worker was neglectful to put their hand where it would get caught

Both cases ignore the fundamental issue of why the machine was unguarded and how the system of work failed in such a way that an injury occurred. Asking questions designed to find out why and how, rather than what, can assist the investigation team to focus on the system of work rather than individual actions which form part of that system.

Many of the questions asked during interviews can easily be classified as binary or yes/ no or true/ false questions. While they can be posed in an open-ended fashion, it is clear from the phrasing and tonal inflection what response is desired. In other cases, the questions probe the existence of behavioural characteristics that a worker is not likely to deny. Examples of obvious yes questions include:

'Did you follow procedure?' 'Were you concentrating when you completed your lift?' 'Are you aware of the safety regulations governing that task?' 'Did you take appropriate precautions?'



Questions limited to the elicitation of yes answers will result in predictable responses and you could make it too easy for the interviewee to misrepresent themselves and to give the answer that they think is wanted.

Forced choice questions

To obtain a more precise answer you can use a forced choice question. This format requires the interviewee to rank a series of possible responses in order of accuracy.

In response to the question, how many hours of overtime do you normally work per week, the options could range from zero hours to a higher amount. By phrasing the question this way, you can source more precise insight into the interviewee's perspectives. This could be useful in the event the investigation team wants to ascertain whether fatigue is a causative factor.

Forced choice questions can be used throughout the investigation process but are best employed to either discount workers or determine a group for inclusion in further investigative activities early on in the investigation process. You could ask how much time workers spent on a particular activity in terms of the number of hours between zero and six, or how many times the activity has been completed within a certain amount of time. This can assist you to analyse which workers might have knowledge of causative events or which workers might be overworked.



8.4 Organise Data.

Upon completion of the collection of the incident data it should then be organised in a methodical and logical manner for the analysis. If this is done well the investigation team will be able to identify any gaps in information or any hypothesis that can't supported with evidence. There are a variety of data organising techniques can be used to assist with the correlation. The method/s used should meet the following requirements:

- Provide a structure to organize the data collected.
- Assist in ensuring the investigation follows a logical path.
- Aid in the resolution of conflicting information and the identification of missing data.
- Provide a visual display of the investigative process for management briefing

There are a variety of data organisation tools available – they can either be timeline or flow chart based as listed below.

TIME LINES	FLOW CHARTS
Simple Timeline	5 Whys
Parallel Timeline	Incident Trees
Event and Condition Charts	Root Cause Analysis
Time Event Charts	Fault Tree Analysis




The ICAM guideline recommend the following methods:

- Event and condition Charts
- Whys
- Incident Trees

8.4.1. Event and Condition Charts

Event and causal factor charting are a written or graphical description for the time sequence of contributing events associated with an accident. They are easy to construct and are a good way of showing often complex events in a logical way. The information / events can be displayed on a white board, wall (with sticky notes) or a large sheet of paper arranging them in a timeline starting from the left to right. This can contribute to developing the time – line / sequence of events for future analysis. If there are parallel events that interact or converge into each other to create an incident, separate timelines are constructed showing the inter- relationship between those events. The following chart illustrates this.









8.4.2. 5 Whys

The 5 Whys technique was developed by Sakichi Toyoda and was used within the Toyota Motor Corporation. The primary goal of the technique is to determine the root cause of a defect or problem by repeating the question "Why?" Each answer forms the basis of the next question. The concept is to ask why an event happened or a condition was present and continue asking why until the question can no longer be answered. When the question can no longer be answered you have reached either a control point (Organizational Factor) a point that is beyond organizational control or a point at which more data needs to be gathered.










8.4.3. Incident Trees

An Incident Tree is a useful way of guiding the investigation process. It arranges the facts in a logical and sequential manner. It provides a cascading display of information that assists the team in recalling what facts need to be considered, how they relate to other facts / events and what information is missing or conflicting. It is often used to analyse process or equipment failure. It can also assist to determine possible causes and to discard other information that is not supported by the facts. An example is provided on the next page.





8. 5. Analyse Data

The investigation team should at this stage have gathered their initial findings and will now proceed to start analysing the data and transferring it onto the ICAM Chart. Each piece of factual information gathered in the investigation findings to date should be classified in accordance with the following categories:


- Contributory Factors / Non-Contributory Facts
- Absent or Failed Defences
- Individual / Team Actions
- Task / Environmental Conditions
- Organisational Factors

Non-contributory facts are facts that exist but have not contributed to the incident. Items like injured person name, the time of the event etc. are examples.

The next step is to work through each of the findings, determine whether they are relevant and if they are deemed to be a contributing factor, classify them into the categories so that they can be included in the ICAM Chart and included in the report to management.



The following process is suggested to construct the ICAM Chart





8.5.1. Identify Absent / Failed Defences

Absent or failed defences are described as the 'last minute measures which did not prevent the outcome of the incident or mitigate/reduce its consequences'. ICAM lists these as: detection systems, protection systems, warning systems, guards or barriers, recovery, escape, rescue, safety device operation, personal protective equipment, hazard identification and control systems. These defences are inanimate and may fail or be absent due to an Individual / Team Action, Task / Environment Condition or Organisational Factor.

The following table outlines the successive layers of defence when each layer comes into play on the failure of the previous defence.

DEFENCE	FEATURE	EXAMPLE
Awareness	These are circumstances where people understand the potential for damage and injury by those doing the work or supervising the task.	Induction, Training, Communication, Hazard ID, Hazard Recognition and Reporting i.e. lack of knowledge about the hazards of driving on a wet haul road.
Detection	Controls that provide an indication of the presence of a hazardous situation	Alarms, Alerts, Monitoring Equipment, Warning Lights, Sensors etc. i.e. Traction control warning if vehicle begins to lose traction.
Control and Interim Recovery	Restoring process / people to safe state with negligible damage.	Emergency Stops, RCD's, By Pass Valves.
Protection and Containment	Limits effects and or contains any release of an unplanned energy, spills, etc.	Bunded Areas, PPE, Fire Extinguishers, Spill Kits
Escape and Rescue	Process to evacuate people from the danger as quickly and safely as possible.	Emergency Exits, Assembly Points, Emergency Planning, Drills, Communication, etc.



8.5.2. Identify Individual / Team Actions

These are the errors or violations that led directly to the incident and are typically associated with personnel having direct contact with the equipment, such as operators or maintenance personnel. Individual or Team Actions are always 'actively' committed and are directly related to the incident. Professor Reason categorised Human Error into the four types

Slips

These occur when you know what to do and are in the process of doing it correctly, however, at some point a step is forgotten or put in but, it's out of order.

Lapses

Refers to the failure to carry out an action due to forgetting.

Mistakes

Are more complex. They occur when you think you are doing the right thing but in reality, you are headed for an incident. This stems from our method of planning and determining the consequence of our actions.

Violations

Are a deliberate deviation from a rule or from a procedure? There are 3 types of violations:

- Routine where the violation has become a normal way of working
- Situational- Breaking the rules due to pressures of the job
- Exceptional-deliberate sabotage



8.5.3. Identify Task / Environmental Conditions

These are the conditions in existence immediately prior to, or at the time of the incident that directly influence human and equipment performance in the workplace. These are the circumstances under which the errors and violations took place and can be embedded in task demands, the work environment, individual capabilities and human factors. The Task / Environmental Conditions can be categorised in two (2) groups: Workplace Factors and Human Factors.



8.5.4. Identify Organisational Factors

These are the underlying factors that often produce the conditions that affect the work performance. They often lie dormant undetected for a considerable time within an organisation and only become apparent when they combine with other factors. Most, if not all incidents take root in organisational factors. Investigators should look beyond human errors, for example, or an equipment failure, without taking into account the system that helped shape the conditions for people's performance and the design, maintenance, inspection and use of that equipment.

CODE	TYPES	DESCRIPTION
нw	Hardware	The quality, availability and position of the tools and equipment - this factor is concerned with the quality of the existing equipment and it's materials rather than the design or poor maintenance.
TR	Training	The provision of the correct skills and knowledge of the employees for them to do their job safely. Failures may include lack of, insufficient, poor or too much training, lack of resources or assessment or mismatch or ability to task.
OR	Organisation	Failure or deficiency in structure of responsibility and accountability. Poor co-ordination, poor supervision, insufficient provision of information and or feedback.
со	Communication	Failure to communicate or failure to communicate adequately. If there is no procedure for communication of hazards in the business, this becomes an Organisational Factor.
IG	Incompatible Goals	Presence of conflicts between goals between different groups. Failure to communicate task priorities. Conflicts in safety planning, implementation, economic goals, and production goals.Production vs Safety conflict.
PR	Procedures	Failure in writing, development and testing of procedures. Procedures not accurate or understandable or not known and used. Poor document control.
мм	Maintenance Management	Appropriateness of the management of maintenance system involving planning, resourcing and procurement. Poor practices involving procedures, tools and training. Absent maintenance manuals. Shortage of specialized maintenance contractors.
DE	Design	The way in which equipment is constructed which may leave vulnerabilities in the way the equipment is used or operated. Poor or inadequate design not fit for purpose using safe by design principles for the full life cycle of the plant.
RM	Risk Management	Application of risk management policies, processes and procedures within the organization to reduce risk to ALARP. It also refers to the ongoing process of risk management within the workplace. Poor hazard identification. Inappropriate use of risk tools. Poor selection of risk controls. Lack of competency for those tasked with risk management assessments.
мс	Management of Change	How well change is managed within the organization including changes to operations, processes, equipment, services and people's roles and accountability. Poor implementation. Change introduced too quickly.

ICAM classifies the system failures into 16 Organisational Factor Types (OFT's) as follows:



CODE	TYPES	DESCRIPTION
СМ	Contractor Management	Evaluation, selection, monitoring and retention of contracted services, equipment, people and material to ensure risks are reduced to ALARP.
ос	Organisational Culture	Culture includes sets of values and beliefs of the organisation and the people who work in the business including company policies and how effective decisions are managed and communicated. Diverse and conflicting values and beliefs. Poor organizational level reporting and relationships. Factions and politics. Unresolved employees fears and anxieties. Low level of trust. Allowance or risk taking behaviors. Poor leadership. Inconsistencies between values and actions on the ground. Lack of compliance, performance monitoring and review.
RI	Regulatory Influence	Regulatory bodies can influence safety culture of the organization by defining and controlling the safety framework that the organization must operate within. This includes legislation, documentation and safety practices required by the regulatory body. Ambiguous or contradictory regulations. Duplicated and conflicting safety requirements. Poor jurisdiction demarcation. Overly prescriptive or unclear requirements.
OL	Organisational Learning	The systems the organisation has in place for ensuring that lessons are learn continuously via risk assessments, auditing, incident reporting, corrective action follow up etc. Poor incident investigation. Poor review of controls. Failure to act on non- conformances. Poor sharing of lessons. Poor commitment to learning. Inadequate incident reporting. Poor safety recording system and data management. Lack of safety records. No analysis of safety trends.
VM	Vehicle Management	System to manage the purchasing, maintenance and operation of vehicles in a safe manner at the workplace. Lack of coordinated approach. Disregard for fit for purpose vehicles. Poor or unclear purchase specifications. Operating vehicles outside of designer specifications.
MS	Management Systems	Integrated set of work practices and procedures for monitoring and continuous improvement of WHS. Poor application of SMS. Poor alignment with standards. Unsystematic. Poor goal setting. Lack of visible commitment. Poor resourcing.




8.6 Validate the Organisational Factors

It is recommended to work through each OFT towards the incident. As an example, the team could ask 'Was Design a factor in this incident?

8.7 Coding of the ICAM Elements

The following Tables contain the coded contributing factor types which organisations may wish to include in their investigation. Question 24 of the Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines 'Queensland Mining Industry reporting manual' August 2015 requires the mine to identify these contributing factors stating:

'Describe the incident in terms of all relevant contributing factors (organisational factors, task/environment conditions, individual/team actions and absent or failed defenses). These factors should be considered as the root causal factors that led to the incident occurring. Select from the drop down lists in each of the corresponding causal factor categories. If entering more than one code per category, then the codes should be entered in order of greatest to least significance in contributing to the incident. Unfortunately, only the top three causal factors per category can be recorded.'





ICAM CODES

There are a few different versions of the coding for the ICAM elements. There is no legal framework or standard for the coding. Here is one of the more common coding systems.

CODE	Contributing Factor Types ABSENT / FAILED DEFENCES
DF1	Awareness – hazard identification
DF2	Awareness – communication
DF3	Awareness – competence/knowledge
DF4	Awareness – supervision
DF5	Awareness -work instruction/procedure
DF6	Detection – visual warning systems
DF7	Detection – aural warning systems
DF8	Detection -speed/movement detectors
DF9	Detection – vigilance/fatigue
DF10	Detection – gas/substance
DF11	Control and Recovery – procedures
DF12	Control and Recovery – bypass valves/circuits
DF13	Control and Recovery – emergency shut down
DF14	Protection and Containment – PPE
DF15	Protection and Containment – fire fighting
DF16	Protection and Containment – spill response
DF17	Protection and Containment -bunding/barricading/exclusion zones
DF18	Escape and Rescue – safe access/egress
DF19	Escape and Rescue – emergency planning/response
DF20	Escape and Rescue – emergency communication
DF21	Other



CODE	Contributing Factor Types INDIVIDUAL / TEAM ACTIONS
ITI	Supervisory error or violation
IT2	Operating authority error or violation
IT3	Operating speed
IT4	Equipment use error or violation
IT5	PPE use error or violation
IT6	Procedural compliance
IT7	Change management error
IT8	Equipment/materials handling error or violation
IT9	Horseplay/thrill seeking error or violation
IT10	Hazard recognition/perception
1111	Hazard management error or violation
IT12	Work method error or violation
IT13	Occupational hygiene practices
IT14	Other



CODE	Contributing Factor Types TASK / ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS - WORKPLACE
TE1	Task Planning / Preparation / Manning
TE2	Hazard Analysis / Job Safety Analysis / Take 5
TE3	Work Procedures availability and suitability
TE4	Permit to work availability and suitability
TE5	Abnormal operation situation / Condition
TE6	Tools / Equipment condition / Availability
TE7	Materials availability and suitability
TE8	Equipment integrity
TE9	Housekeeping
TE10	Weather conditions
TEII	Congestion/ Restrictions / Access
TE12	Routine / Non-routine task
TE13	Fire and / or explosion hazard
TE14	Lighting
TE15	Equipment / Material temperature / Conditions
TE16	Noise
TE17	Ventilation
TE18	Gas, dust or fumes
TE19	Radiation
TE20	Chemical
TE21	Wildlife
TE22	Surface Gradient / Conditions
TE23	Reduced / Restricted visibility
TE24	Other Factor



CODE	Contributing Factor Types TASK / ENVIRONMENT – HUMAN FACTORS
HF1	Complacency/motivation/desensitization to hazard
HF2	Drugs/Alcohol influence
HF3	Familiarity with task
HF4	Fatigue
HF5	Situational awareness
HF6	Time/productivity pressures
HF7	Peer pressure/supervisory example
HF8	Physical capabilities
HF9	Mental capabilities
HF10	Physical stress
HF11	Mental stress
HF12	Confidence level
HF13	Secondary level
HF14	Personal issues
HF15	Distraction/pre-occupation
HF16	Experience/knowledge/skill for task
HF17	Competency
HF18	Behavioral beliefs (gains – risks)
HF19	Personality/attitude
HF20	Poor communications
HF21	Poor shift patterns & overtime working
HF22	Passive tolerance of violations
HF23	Perceived license to bend rules
HF24	Change of routine
HF25	Reliance on undocumented knowledge
HF26	Other Human Factor




CODE	Contributing Factor Types ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
нพ	Hardware
TR	Training
OR	Organisation
со	Communication
IG	Incompatible Goals
PR	Procedures
ММ	Maintenance Management
DE	Design
RM	Risk Management
МС	Management of Change
СМ	Contractor Management
OC	Organisational Culture
RI	Regulatory Influence
OL	Organisational Learning
VM	Vehicle Management
MS	Management Systems



8.8 ICAM Analysis

The following six steps are recommended when facilitating the incident analysis:

- 1. Preparing and Gathering of Evidence
- 2. Identify Absent / Failed Defenses
- 3. Identify Individual / Team Actions
- 4. Identify Task / Environment Conditions
- 5. Identify Organisational Factors
- 6. Develop Recommendations



The process is depicted in the following flow charts.



1.PREPARATION

Assemble ICAM Analysis Team

Critically review Contributing Factors in the PEEPO Chart

Ensure there is adequate data to enable a good ICAM analysis

Review timelines, E&C chart, 5 Whys, etc.

Brief ICAM team on the process

Define the incident: • What happened • What was the consequence • What was the potential **Guide:** Small team depending on severity of incident

> **Tip:** Use Post-It Notes

Example:

Operator falls from the step ladder hurting his back and misses his next two shifts





2.IDENTIFY DEFENCES

Ask the team... What is the first defence that should have prevented this incident?

Ask the team... What is the next defence that should have prevented this incident?

Continue until all the failed defences are identified

Tip: Use the timeline

Tip: You should have identified 3 to 5 failed defences

Consider:

An absent defence is a reasonable expectation of what should have been in place

Ask the team... What defences should have been in place to prevent this incident?

Ask the team...

What defences could have minimised the damage/harm?

Tip: Some defences are containment not

preventative. e.g. seatbelts

Example:

No barrier to protect run off to adjacent roadway



3. IDENTIFY ACTIONS

Ask the team... Who was directly involved?

For each person involved, ask the team.... What errors

Tip: Avoid opinions or emotive terms

Tip: Ensure there is a verb

Tip: Driver exceeded the posted speed limit



4. IDENTIFY CONDITIONS

Ask the team... What conditions influences the behaviours? **Example:** Road was contaminated with mud

Ask the team... What conditions influences the risk level? **Tip:** Review identified defences and actions and try to identify conditions that influenced them

Ask the team... What conditions undermined the system defences **Example:** Sun aspect made the stoplight hard to see



5. IDENTIFY ORG FACTORS

Ask the team... "What Org Factors produced the behavioural influences"

> Ask the team... "What Org Factors

Ask the team... "What Org Factors allowed adverse conditions to go unaddressed?

Ask the team... "What Org Factors promoted or passively tolerated risk taking

Ask the team... "What Org Factors removed or undermined the system defences

Assist the team in categorising the Org Factors into the 16 OFT's

Tip:

Try to establish the underlying causes of poor system defences

Example:

OL Despite many hazard reports, trees were allowed to overhang road signs

Tip: Evaluate mgt response to previous events

Consider:

An Org Factor can be categorised into more than one OFT's



6. DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS

Start with each Org Factor in turn and develop a recommendation to address it

Check if the recommendation addresses any other Org Factor or defence

Continue until all the Org Factors and defences have been addressed

Do a final check that all the Org Factors and defences have been addressed

Develop 2 to 3 key Learnings from the event to share around the business

Do a final check and ask the team "Are you happy with the result, have we done enough to stop a similar event?"

Example:

Poor- Review site traffic management Good- Conduct speed audits on site main access road



8.9 Form Recommendations & Report

The investigation must make appropriate recommendations for corrective actions each contributing factor to prevent a similar event. This can be achieved by addressing all factors identified in the absent / failed defence and organisational factors during this analysis. Not all factors will be able to be eliminated or managed properly due to various other competing agendas however it is the investigation team's responsibility to present all recommendations to management for them to determine what is practical at that point and put in place an action plan to remedy the various causes of the incident. Recommendations should be SMARTER:

Specific - recommendations are activities that can be undertaken by a work group and not general motherhood statements. e.g., "all people to take care"
Measurable - to determine if recommendations are effective
Achievable - recommendations are feasible and practical
Realistic - recommendations must be relevant, proportional to the risk and within our control (e.g., you may not be able to fix the pothole as it is a public road. However, you can notify the Main Roads Department)
Timely - recommendations must be completed in appropriate timeframes
Effective – does the control reduce to risk of recurrence
Reviewed – reassess controls implemented to ensure they remain effective The team

should review each contributing factor and should outline:

- appropriate recommendations that should, if implemented, mitigate the risk to an acceptable level
- improvements to the systems defenses to limit the consequences of the contributing factor
- suggest interim short-term solutions for immediate corrective action

Management should thoroughly review each recommendation. They should determine the benefits of any corrective action and the implication to other parts of the system should the corrective action be implemented.

WHS/OH&S legislation requires that a business eliminates the hazard and where it is not practicable to do so they must adopt the risk management process to an ACCEPTABLE LEVEL of risk which is as AS LOW AS REASONABLY ACCEPTABLE (ALARA). Risk controls should be selected given consideration to the Hierarchy of Controls with Elimination the most preferred and PPE (or behaviour is some businesses Hierarchy of Control Diagrams) the least.



HIERARCHY OF CONTROL DIAGRAM

Hierarchy of Controls



8.10 Conclude the Investigation

The investigation team must not only have the skills and knowledge to initiate, plan and conduct the investigation. They must also know how to conclude the investigation in accordance with their organisations policy and procedures. The team should:

- Review all documents, evidence and facts to ensure that the evidence supports the corrective actions recommended and that the recommendations are proportional to the risk, feasible and realistic.
- Review all witness statements and interview notes to ensure nothing has been missed
- Determine what form and type of report needs to be compiled, who the recipients of that report are and when that report should be provided to those groups.
- Identify whether their incident report findings are only relevant to that site or whether they have broader implications to the business or industry.
- Draft a report and disseminate for comment to the relevant stakeholders for comment and feedback.



8.11 Report the Findings

The Incident Investigation Report should be presentation of the investigation findings and recommendations. Whilst there is no rule on what structure, layout or form a report should take it is advisable to include the ICAM chart to assist management in understanding the various factors that have contributed to the incident. It is generally recommended that a report should include:

- 1. Incident Description
- 2. Key Findings
- 3. Root cause
- 4. Conclusion and Observations
- 5. Recommendations including implementation details
- 6. Significant Learnings
- 7. Appendices
- 8. ICAM Analysis
- 9. Corrective Action
- 10. Report Sign Off

Students will be provided with Template Incident Investigation Reports at the course.

Remember the fundamental aim of any incident investigation is to understand what

happened so we can prevent it from happening again!



APPENDIX 1: INCIDENT INVESTIGATION CHECKLIST

ACTION	YES	NO	N/A	COMMENTS
Secure scene				
Immediate preventative actions				
Internal notifications (immediate supervisor, WHS/OH&S team, senior managers, legal team, PR team)				
External notifications to regulators (e.g., Safe Work, EPA)				
Notify next of kin if required				
Offer employee assistance program (EAP) if relevant				
Complete internal reporting requirements				
Determine level of investigation				
Appoint investigation team				
Identify information to be gathered (use PEEPO as a prompt)				
Conduct site inspection				
Interview witnesses / others				
Collect other information				
Release the scene (if notifiable, this requires regulators' approval)				
Establish sequence of events				
Develop incident (why) tree				
Determine causes				
Conduct ICAM analysis				
Determine recommendations				
Submit report				
Management review of report				
Agree corrective actions and responsibilities				
Communicate findings				
Follow up and check actions				



APPENDIX 2: INCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUALITY REVIEW

Does the investigation include the following?	YES	NO	COMMENTS
Is there Clear Executive Summary?			
 Is there a clear description of the incident? Date, time and location Who was involved? The immediate cause(s) of the incident Details of Injury/ Harm/ Consequences Sequence of events Emergency response and immediate corrective actions 			
Is there a review of absent/ failed defenses (risk controls)?			
Did they work?Why / why not?			
For individual / team actions involved, did we investigate:			
 Were errors or violations involved? Why did people act as they did? 			
Does the investigation identify contributing factors (ICAM categories)?			
 Absent/ failed defenses Individual / team actions Task / environmental condition Organizational factor s (underlying causes) 			
Will recommended corrective actions prevent a similar incident in the future?			
 Improve risk controls (absent / failed defenses) Address organisational factors identified 			
Does the report identify lessons learned that can be communicated across the organisation?			
Is the report written clearly and in plain English?			
Is the report free of error s and inconsistencies?			
Are the conclusions supported by information and free of speculation?			
Does the report identify what information was gathered during the investigation (e.g., using PEEPO)?			
 What documents were reviewed Whether the scene and equipment were inspected (possibly including photos or pictures) Who was interviewed? Other sources of information 			
Has the report been signed off by team members and the report been circulated to required stakeholders?			



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